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CONSEQUENCES: LEVERAGE AND 
COERCION IN NEGOTIATION 
Paul F. Kirgis* 
ABSTRACT 
Leverage has been called “negotiation’s prime mover,” conferring 
power to reach agreement “on your terms.” This power, however, is 
not always benign. When a negotiator has sufficient power to compel a 
counterparty to accept a set of unfavorable terms, the use of leverage 
may cross a line into inappropriate or illegal coercion. While coercion 
has been the subject of rich philosophical investigation, the topic of 
coercive power has received only cursory treatment in the negotiation 
literature. This article seeks to fill that gap by analyzing the uses and 
limits of negotiating leverage, which I define as power rooted in 
consequences. I identify two types of leverage—positive and negative—
and explore the legal and ethical implications of each type, drawing on 
the political theory of coercion as well as primary and secondary legal 
sources. I conclude by analyzing the contract doctrines of duress and 
unconscionability to show how an understanding of leverage can aid in 
the application of legal rules. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During the acrimonious federal budget battles of 2013, House 
Republicans sought to pressure President Barack Obama and Senate 
Democrats to accede to Republican legislative demands by threatening to 
block an increase in the federal debt limit—a legislative step necessary for 
 
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, and Faculty Chair, Hugh L. Carey 
Center for Dispute Resolution. I am grateful to Ran Kuttner, Mark Movsesian, Michael 
Perino, Brian Tamanaha, Stephen Ware, Michael Wheeler, and the participants in the ADR 
Works-in-Progress Conference at the University of Oregon School of Law for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
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the government to continue meeting its financial obligations.1 Initially, 
Republicans demanded equivalent spending cuts in exchange for an 
increase in the debt limit; later they turned their attention to the President’s 
signature health care law, threatening to deny an increase in the 
government’s borrowing authority unless the President and Senate 
Democrats agreed to defund the Affordable Health Care Act.2 During an 
earlier round of negotiations in the summer of 2011, Democrats had agreed 
to accept equivalent spending cuts in exchange for an increase in the debt 
limit.3 Congressional Republicans considered the debt ceiling to be an 
effective and a legitimate source of bargaining power. Speaker of the 
House John Boehner reportedly told President Barack Obama that 
“everything you want in life comes with a price,” suggesting that he viewed 
a further increase in the debt ceiling as an item of exchange that 
Republicans could withhold or concede as part of a rational and fair 
negotiation process.4 
President Obama responded to the Republicans’ invocation of the 
debt-ceiling by charging them with violating a negotiation norm. With 
widespread news coverage predicting dire economic and fiscal 
consequences if the United States were to default on it obligations,5 Obama 
declared that “the financial well-being of the American people is not 
leverage to be used.”6 He explicitly rejected the proposition that the debt 
ceiling was a legitimate item of exchange: “The full faith and credit of the 
 
 1.  See Michael D. Shear & Jackie Calmes, Lawmakers Gird for Next Clash, on the 
Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A1. Without increasing the debt limit, the 
government would be able to meet its legislatively-enacted spending obligations, as it is 
required by law to do. For several decades, The House of Representatives had automatically 
produced a resolution changing the debt limit by the amount recommended in the budget 
resolution for the next year, so that the government always had the authority to borrow the 
money necessary to pay for the spending Congress authorized. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEBT LIMIT: DELAYS CREATE DEBT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
AND INCREASE UNCERTAINTY IN THE TREASURY MARKET (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11203.pdf. 
 2.  See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Lawmakers at Odds Over Federal Borrowing Limit, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2013, at A4; Peter Baker, Obama Scorns G.O.P. “Blackmail” on 
Health Law, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at A14. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Shear & Calmes, supra note 1, at A1. Senator Mitch McConnell characterized the 
debt-ceiling tactic as a legitimate form of leverage in an appearance on “Face the Nation”: 
“We have to use whatever leverage we have. And there are some examples of leverage 
coming along. The debt ceiling is one of them that hopefully would get the president 
engaged.” William Saletan, The G.O.P.’s Empty Threats, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2013, at 15. 
 5.  See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Debt Ceiling Rises Again as Threat for U.S., NEW 
YORK TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at B1. 
 6.  Jackie Calmes & Jonathan Weisman, Obama and G.O.P. Issue Challenges for 
Their Conflicting Views on the Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, January 15, 2013, at A15 (emphasis 
added). 
KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE) SUN 2/9  9:39 PM 
Season 201x] Desktop Publishing Example 103 
United States of America is not a bargaining chip.”7 The President equated 
the invocation of the debt ceiling with a criminal threat and refused to 
bargain over it, vowing that House Republicans “will not collect a ransom 
in exchange for not crashing the American economy.”8 
Though President Obama employed “leverage” as an epithet, not all 
applications of leverage in negotiation are illegitimate. Indeed, leverage is 
often described as “negotiation’s prime mover,”9 praised for conferring the 
“power not just to reach agreement, but to obtain an agreement on your 
own terms.”10 Why was the President able to credibly argue that the 
Republican strategy had crossed a line from legitimate bargaining to 
illegitimate “ransom”?11 What about the Republicans’ invocation of the 
debt ceiling made it an inappropriate (in the eyes of the President) exercise 
of “leverage”? 
In common parlance, leverage is a synonym for power. Power, 
however, is a broad and amorphous concept. Robert Dahl, a leading 
theorist on political power, defines power in these terms: “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not 
otherwise do.”12 Power in negotiation may similarly be understood as the 
ability to affect favorably someone else’s decisions.13 Negotiating power 
can take many different forms, including status, knowledge and 
information, organizational control, personal charisma, and superior 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See, e.g., H. Lee Hetherington, Negotiating Lessons from Iran: Synthesizing 
Langdell & MacCrate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1995). 
 10.  G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR 
REASONABLE PEOPLE 90 (2d ed. 2006). 
 11.  President Obama was not alone in his reaction to the Republicans’ debt ceiling 
strategy. See Ruth Marcus, Which party will blink? WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2013, at A15 
(“Administration officials point to warnings from former House speaker Newt Gingrich 
about using the debt ceiling as a negotiating tactic. They note that McConnell shied away 
from repeating debt-ceiling threats, and that House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal, described the debt ceiling as ‘not the ultimate 
leverage.’”); Shear & Calmes, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting David M. Cote, chairman of 
Honeywell and a Republican member of the 2010 Simpson-Bowles fiscal commission, 
saying that “[t]he whole idea of using debt ceiling that way or saying ‘I’ll do this horrible 
thing to all of us unless you give in’ just doesn’t make any sense for anybody.”); Robert M. 
Solow, Our Debt, Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A29. 
 12.  Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI 201–15 (1957), reprinted in 
POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 80 (Roderick Bell et al., eds. 1969) 
(collecting essays on the nature of power). 
 13.  See Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 149 (1983), as reprinted in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 127, 128 (J. 
William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds. 1991).  
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alternatives.14 Leverage is best understood as a subset of power, and like 
other sources of power, may be used legitimately or illegitimately. 
I use the term leverage to refer to a specific type of power: power 
rooted in consequences. That is, a party has leverage when it has the ability 
to influence another party through the threat of or the imposition of 
consequences on that party. Leverage is distinct from other sources of 
power, which derive their force from either psychological processes or 
social norms such as moral principle, charisma, or rank. Leverage 
encompasses all forms of power based on a party’s ability to confer 
material benefits or impose material costs on a counterparty. President 
Obama appears to have used leverage in this sense when he chastised 
House Republicans. The President objected to the use of the debt ceiling as 
a “bargaining chip,” meaning, as a benefit to be conferred or a cost to be 
imposed. 
My goal in this article is to explore the use and abuse of leverage—
defined as power rooted in consequences—in negotiation. A key ingredient 
in this effort is the concept of coercion.15 The ability to impose 
consequences on a counterparty entails the potential to coerce. Negotiators 
often feel that they have “no choice” but to agree to a particular deal, either 
because they have no good alternatives or because the alternative, not 
agreeing, is too high. By linking leverage and ransom, President Obama 
suggested House Republicans were attempting to hold him, and the 
government, hostage. The President claimed that Republicans sought to 
coerce rather than bargain in good faith. But not every exercise of leverage 
 
 14.  See id. at 130. Roger Fisher, an original proponent of principled negotiation, 
identifies six categories of power: emphasizing skill and knowledge, good relationships, 
good alternatives, elegant solutions, legitimacy, and commitment. On the opposite end of 
the philosophical spectrum, “power negotiating” guru Roger Dawson argues that power 
comes not primarily from principle, but from status, the ability to reward or coerce, 
charisma, organizational control over a situation, and information. See ROGER DAWSON, 
SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING 253–82 (2d ed. 2001). Robert Adler and Elliot Silverstein 
distill those same concepts into four sources of power: personal power, organizational 
power, information power, and moral power. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, 
When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23–28 (2000). Adler and Silverstein define personal power as “inherent 
individual traits that a person brings to a negotiation not directly associated with his or her 
organizational status;” organizational power as “the formal power of a given position and [] 
the actual control a position has within an organization;” information power as the expertise 
or research that allow a negotiator to “see the context of a given situation clearly and 
respond accordingly;” and moral power as the ability to “achieve gains through appeals to 
fairness or morality.”  Id. at 23–24. 
 15.  See Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”: Virtue Words and Vice Words, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 560. Westen refers to coercion in terms almost identical to those used 
by Fisher and Dawson to define power: “Coercion is an interpersonal relation in which one 
person affects the behavior of another.”   
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in negotiation crosses a moral or legal line. Understanding the moral and 
legal limits on leverage in negotiation requires understanding the social 
norms surrounding coercion.16 
In this article, I rely on philosophical literature on coercion to distill 
the normative criteria used to judge the coerciveness of a proposal. Then I 
connect those insights with negotiation theory and the legal doctrines 
governing contract formation and avoidance to analyze leverage and its 
limits in negotiation. I contend that our moral intuitions about coercion can 
be elucidated by exploring the understanding of leverage that emerges from 
negotiation theory. I offer a framework for understanding the different 
forms of leverage and their relative degrees of coerciveness. Finally, I show 
how these considerations appear in the judicial treatment of negotiation 
practices through the contract doctrines of duress and unconscionability. 
Central to this analysis is a distinction I draw between two forms of 
leverage, described by Richard Shell as “positive leverage” and “negative 
leverage.”17 Positive leverage derives from a party’s ability to satisfy the 
counterparty’s interests. For example, the logrolling that is a routine, if 
often lamented, part of the legislative process rests on positive leverage.18 
Legislators bargain to satisfy each others’ interests, trading votes on 
matters of less importance to them in exchange for other members’ votes 
on matters of greater importance. The strength of their leverage depends on 
the value of what they have to offer, measured against the value to them of 
what the other side offers to trade. 
Negative leverage is derived from a party’s ability to impose costs on 
the counterparty if the counterparty refuses to agree to a set of terms. When 
President Obama implied that House Republicans were engaged in 
 
 16.  The topic of coercive power has received surprisingly little consideration in the 
negotiation literature, even in work that deals explicitly with power. Roger Fisher never 
assesses coercive tactics such as threats at all, and even Roger Dawson spends only a few 
pages discussing “coercive power,” which he defines as the power to punish. See Dawson, 
supra note at 264-68. The scholarly literature is no more fulsome, with virtually no work 
devoted to retributive or overtly coercive power. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on 
Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325. Goodpaster discusses most of the same 
competitive tactics described by Dawson, and offers only one small paragraph on threats. 
Other analyses focus almost entirely on the power that comes from having better 
alternatives than the counterparty. That is the focus, for example, of Daniel Barnhizer’s 
extensive treatment of inequality of bargaining power and Russell Korobkin’s more cursory 
analysis of bargaining power as threat of impasse. See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, 
Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005); Russell Korobkin, 
Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 867 (2004). 
 17.  See SHELL, supra note 10, at 101. 
 18.  See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2000). A number 
of states have tried to curb logrolling through “single subject” rules that require the 
legislature to confine all acts to a single subject. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject 
Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006). 
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extortion, he was suggesting that they were improperly using negative 
leverage. He argued that Congress had an existing obligation to pay the 
debts it incurred—which it could not do without raising the debt limit—and 
that the failure to pay those debts would impose unacceptable costs on the 
country. House Republicans were threatening to impose a cost, one that 
would entail considerable harm to their own governing interests,19 if the 
President did not agree to the spending cuts. 
Part II begins with an analysis of the philosophical literature on 
coercion, focusing on the work of Robert Nozick and Peter Westen. Part III 
details the distinction between positive and negative leverage, and shows 
how negative leverage, unlike positive leverage, carries coercive force. 
This section also demonstrates that positive leverage is not always used for 
good, nor is negative leverage always used for evil. Part IV analyzes 
contract doctrine in light of the theory of leverage, and explains how this 
theory can shed light on courts’ grounds for relieving parties of their 
contractual obligations. Although they do not speak in terms of positive 
and negative leverage, in practice, courts give greater scrutiny to 
bargaining practices employing negative leverage than to those employing 
positive leverage. I argue, as a prescriptive matter, that understanding the 
positive and negative leverage in the bargaining processes can help courts 
to apply the doctrines of duress and unconscionability in more consistent 
and rational ways. Abuses of negative leverage ought to be understood as 
grounds for contract unenforceability under the principle of duress, while 
abuses of positive leverage should be understood as grounds for contract 
unenforceability under the principle of unconscionability. 
Although the theory of leverage I offer has implications for a variety of 
negotiation and legal contexts,20 I focus on a relatively narrow set of issues. 
Leverage plays a role in almost all negotiations. Social attitudes about the 
appropriateness of various applications of leverage differ widely across 
those contexts. This article does not attempt to grapple with all the 
ramifications this theory entails. Instead, it represents an initial effort to 
 
 19.  If the United States were to default, its credit rating would worsen, raising its 
borrowing costs and exacerbating federal budget deficits. See Robert M. Solow, Our Debt, 
Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A29. 
 20.  To give just one example, questions about coercion and duress often arise in the 
criminal law. Duress is a defense to a criminal charge; in such a case, an accused has carried 
out a criminal act, but asserts duress as a reason to avoid punishment. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.09 (providing that duress is an excuse for criminal activity when “a person of 
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”). I focus on the 
related but distinct question of duress as a contract defense; in this situation, a contracting 
party has made a commitment to carry out a legal act, but asserts duress as a reason to avoid 
that commitment. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 152–54 (1987) (contrasting criminal 
defense of duress and contract defense of duress). 
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formulate a theory of leverage and demonstrate its utility in commercial 
disputes, such as arms-length transactions in which a weaker party seeks to 
escape contractual obligations on grounds of duress or unconscionability. 
II.  COERCION AND THE SOCIAL NORMS LIMITING LEVERAGE IN 
NEGOTIATION 
Within the Western socio-political tradition, coercion is considered a 
social evil.21  In the terminology of Peter Westen, “coercion” is a vice 
word—a word that conveys a derogatory normative judgment.22  It is 
contrasted with “freedom,” a virtue word conveying a positive normative 
judgment. Our federal and state constitutions exist in large measure to limit 
governmental coercion and promote individual freedom of action. A 
variety of criminal and civil laws proscribe coercion or excuse actions 
coerced by others in the private sphere. Chief among them are laws 
prohibiting extortion, the defense of duress to criminal or civil liability,23 
and contract doctrines offering relief from agreements on grounds of duress 
and unconscionability.24 
If coercion is a social evil, it is a subtle one. Coercion involves a 
paradox: coercion is an evil because it robs a person of her freedom of 
action, yet coercion exists only when the coerced person acts under her 
own volition.25  For example, I coerce a person if I threaten to break her 
arm unless she gives me her money; I do not coerce her if I forcibly remove 
her wallet from her possession.26  The difference between the two is that in 
the first case, the success of my venture depends on her taking a volitional 
action to give me her money. Even if volitional, however, her action 
arguably is not voluntary. In the lexicon of The Godfather, I made her an 
offer she could not refuse.27 
 
 21.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 4 (“The general assumption is that promises 
are binding, rights can be waived, and punishment appropriately applied if, but only if, the 
relevant actions are voluntary.”). 
 22.  See Westen, supra note 15, at 547–48. 
 23.  See generally John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. 
REV. 275 (1999). 
 24.  See infra Section IV. 
 25.  See Hill, supra note 23, at 286–87. 
 26.  See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 440 
(Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (“If I lure you into an escape-proof room in New 
York and leave you imprisoned there, I do not coerce you into not going to Chicago though 
I make you unfree to do it.”). 
 27.  Alan Wertheimer refers to this condition as “constrained volition.”  See 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 9. Wertheimer also explains the different ways of 
understanding “choice,” and what we mean when we say a person has “no choice” but to 
take some action. Id. at 192–201. 
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Complicating the concept of coercion is the distinction between 
threats, predictions, and warnings.28  Coercion implies that the party 
making the proposal has the power to carry out the proposed course of 
action. For example, if a negative turn of events is likely to happen as a 
natural consequence of a counterparty’s action, and I tell the counterparty 
that he can avoid the consequence by refraining from the action, and he 
does refrain from the action, I have not coerced him.29  Rather, I have made 
a prediction or a warning. Coercion requires more than this. It requires that 
I have the ability (or apparent ability) to cause the negative consequence, 
that my counterparty understands this, and that my counterparty declines to 
take an action he would otherwise take in order to avoid the consequence.30 
Coercion claims rest on two related moral duties tied to the value of 
liberty: First, the moral duty not to take advantage of another’s 
vulnerability to override that person’s will (this is a violation of the Kantian 
maxim not to use others as a means to one’s own ends);31 and second, the 
moral duty not to harm.32  All coercion involves the violation of both these 
principles, albeit in particular ways that make the definitional endeavor so 
taxing. 
 
 28.  See Hill, supra note 23, at 292–96 (critiquing theories distinguishing threats from 
offers). The typical formulation posits that threats promise to make the recipient worse off 
than he would otherwise be in relation to some baseline (often the recipient’s expectations), 
while offers promise to make the recipient better off than he would otherwise be in relation 
that baseline. See Westen, supra note 15, at 571–73; WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 204–
11; Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals, 4 POLITICAL THEORY 65, 66 (1976) (“Threats worsen 
your position compared to what you can expect, whereas (non-coercive) offers do not.”). 
Expectations also seem to play a key role in Kent Greenawalt’s definition of manipulative 
threats. Greenawalt argues that threats are illegally coercive only if they are “situation-
altering,” by which he means the threatened action is not what would take place in the 
“normal” (expected?) course of events. See Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and 
Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081 (1983). 
I avoid this semantic tangle by focusing not on whether a proposal is a threat or an offer, but 
on whether it satisfies either party’s interests.  
 29.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 453 (1974). 
 30.  See Westen, supra note 15, at 569. Westen defines coercion as: 
A constraint or promise of constraint, Y, that X[1] knowingly brings to bear on X in order 
that X choose to do something, Z[1], that X would not otherwise do and that X does not wish 
to be constrained to do, where X knows that X[1] is bringing or promising to bring Y to bear 
on him for that purpose, and where the constraint renders X’s doing Z[1] more eligible to X 
than it would otherwise be. 
 31.  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (“[A]ct that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”). 
 32.  See Haksar, supra note 28, at 69 (“[F]or a proposal to be coercive, it is necessary 
that the proposal should involve a wrong to the recipient.”). 
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A.  Nozick on Coercion and Free Will 
As detailed above, coercion is normally considered a social evil, in 
part, because it renders actions that appear to be volitional involuntary. It 
violates norms favoring freedom of the will.33  The difficulty is that we 
impair each other’s freedom of action all the time. Every action we take 
changes the world, and as a consequence, constricts the range of possible 
actions for others. To understand the social limits on leverage in 
negotiation, we need a way to distinguish inappropriate infringements on 
others’ freedom of action from mundane and unobjectionable consequential 
actions of daily life.34 
Robert Nozick addresses this dilemma with his theory of voluntary 
exchange. This theory distinguishes between facts of nature and willful acts 
of others. A person’s actions are voluntary if limited by facts of nature. For 
example, I cannot fly due to physical laws, but this does not render my 
decision to walk involuntary.35  On the other hand, if another person takes 
an action that limits my options, whether my decision is voluntary or 
involuntary depends on whether the other person had the right to act as he 
did. An action is voluntary even if constrained by another person so long as 
the other person had the right to act in the way she did.36  When a person 
makes the choice between accepting a particular job at a particular wage or 
starving, his choice is voluntary as long as all the other people whose 
actions resulted in that constraint were acting within their rights.37 
Nozick’s approach to voluntariness raises the question of what it 
means to “act within one’s rights.”  Clearly a person does not act within his 
rights if he engages in illegal conduct, such as physical violence. But that is 
not typical. Coercion usually involves more subtle means, and often the 
threatened conduct would be legal examined apart from the context. This is 
the “paradox of blackmail.”  In the words of James Lindgren, “[i]n 
 
 33.  These norms have deep roots in the western tradition. In the Nichomacean Ethics, 
Aristotle took pains to distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions for purposes of 
defining virtue: “On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one 
does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one 
could withstand.” Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 349, 349 
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947). 
 34.  See Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1557 
(1996) (analyzing Kant’s theory of rights and duties) (“Any obligation that a person bears 
must be presented as part of a system of mutual respect among all persons, not merely as an 
artifact of one person’s demands. People are entitled to assume in the state of nature that 
their external freedom will be limited only to the extent necessary to harmonize their 
freedom with that of everyone else in accordance with a universal law . . . .”). 
 35.  See NOZICK, supra note 29, at 262. 
 36.  See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 217. 
 37.  See NOZICK, supra note 29, at 262. 
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blackmail, the heart of the problem is that two separate acts, each of which 
is a moral and legal right, can combine to make a moral and legal 
wrong.”38 Asking someone for money is not wrong; telling the police that a 
crime has been committed is also not wrong. But threatening to tell the 
police that a crime has been committed, while asking for money, is a 
crime.39 
Nozick articulates a theory of “productive activities” that helps to 
resolve this conundrum. For Nozick, the central problem with blackmail is 
that it is not a productive activity. Productive activities are “those that make 
purchasers better off than if the seller had nothing at all to do with them.”40 
If one party pays another not to harm him, there has not been a productive 
exchange. Blackmail is unproductive because the purchaser (the person 
being blackmailed) is not made better off after the transaction than he 
would have been had the blackmailer never entered his life.41 
Voluntary exchanges occur where both parties are the recipients of 
productive activities. But there is an important caveat. Nozick considers an 
exchange voluntary even though it does not confer a net benefit on the 
purchaser if the purchaser is compensating the seller for forgoing a 
productive exchange with a third party.42  So, if a writer is offered money 
by a publisher to publish a book containing damaging secrets about A, A’s 
payment to the writer to forgo publishing the damaging secrets “counts” as 
a productive, and hence voluntary, exchange. But the seller of silence may 
“legitimately charge only what he forgoes by silence,” and “[w]hat he 
forgoes does not include the payment he could have received to abstain 
from revealing his information, though it does include the payments others 
would make to him to reveal the information.”43  In other words, he cannot 
demand more than the actual loss to him from forgoing publication.44 
 
 38.  James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 
670 (1984). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  NOZICK, supra note 29, at 84 (emphasis in original). 
 41.  Id. Nozick notes an exception for cases in which the paying party deserves to be 
harmed by the other. Cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1935, 1962 (1993) (arguing that blackmail threatening to disclose criminality might 
confer overall economic benefits to society by deterring crime). 
 42.  Id. at 86. 
 43.  Id. at 85. 
 44.  James Lindgren criticizes Nozick’s theory as failing to account for certain types of 
exchanges that do not constitute blackmail but seem to be unproductive in Nozick’s terms. 
Lindgren uses the example of a person injured by a falling tree who threatens to sue the 
property owner where the tree stood unless paid compensation. See Lindgren, supra note 38, 
at 699. But that is precisely the case Nozick accounts for by saying a party can fairly ask to 
be compensated for forgoing an activity that would benefit him. The injured passerby has 
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Nozick’s theory of voluntary exchange suggests an important 
distinction between forms and uses of leverage. When a negotiator employs 
the leverage that comes from her ability to satisfy the other party’s interests 
or from her willingness to pursue an alternative means of satisfying the 
negotiator’s interests, she is engaged in productive activity in Nozick’s 
formulation. As long as the negotiator proposes to pursue only alternatives 
that genuinely satisfy her interests, then the most she can request (in the 
sense of the maximum force her leverage has) is to be compensated for 
forgoing those alternatives.45  She is acting within her rights. So imagine 
that A, a homeowner, is concerned that her neighbor B’s dog will enter her 
property and damage something of value. A can solve the problem by 
putting up a fence, or B can address the problem by leashing the dog. A 
says to B, “I’m planning to put up a fence, but I’ll hold off if you agree to 
leash your dog.” B wants neither option to come to pass. To the extent A is 
proposing to put up a fence that satisfies her interests, however, she is 
proposing a voluntary exchange. 
On the other hand, an involuntary exchange occurs when a party 
proposes to impose costs on the counterparty for pursuing the 
counterparty’s alternatives, through actions that do not satisfy the party’s 
interests. What the party proposes to forgo in such a case is not something 
that entitles him to compensation. If A proposes to build an unnecessarily 
high and unattractive fence (one that even she does not desire), she has no 
right to be compensated for forgoing that fence. A is not acting within her 
rights, and so, she is not proposing a voluntary exchange. She is attempting 
to coerce B.46 
Nozick’s theory of voluntary exchange provides a valuable starting 
point for identifying negotiating behaviors that are coercive. However, 
more work needs to be done to explicate the social norms that regulate 
leverage in negotiation. Some proposals are morally unacceptable though 
they result in productive activity in Nozick’s sense. By the same token, 
some proposals that impose costs on a counterparty without satisfying the 
proposer’s interests are morally acceptable. Nozick does not fully account 
for these apparent anomalies.47 
 
the right to sue for his injuries, and is merely offering to forego that right in exchange for 
fair compensation. 
 45.  Wertheimer seems to have a similar conception in mind with his focus on whether 
the offeror had a preexisting plan to engage in the conduct proposed; that would suggest that 
the proposal would satisfy the offeror’s interests. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 220. 
 46.  Ronal Coase suggests that coercion of this type is equivalent to blackmail. See 
Ronald Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (1988). 
 47.  See Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 
478 (1980) (“defining voluntariness in [Nozick’s] way conflicts with deeply entrenched 
notions of moral responsibility”). 
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B.  Westen on the Moral Limits of Coercion 
Peter Westen’s attempt to identify the features of a proposal that make 
it coercive extends Nozick’s theory to better encompass moral concerns. 
Westen attempts to distinguish “threats,” which impose “burdens,” from 
“offers,” which confer “benefits.”  He distinguishes threats/burdens from 
offers/benefits along two axes: the expectations of the parties and the moral 
standards of society. We can assess whether a proposal is coercive by 
asking what state of affairs the recipient of the proposal would have 
expected in the absence of the proposed course of action and what state of 
affairs the recipient is entitled to expect given society’s moral standards. To 
be coercive, a proposal must leave the recipient “worse off either than he 
otherwise expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do the 
proponent’s bidding.”48  Westen measures the conditions that “ought” to 
obtain in terms of legal and moral obligations—in other words, in terms of 
social norms.49 
Westen’s normative criterion—how a party “ought” to be left—helps 
to explain why certain exercises of leverage are considered unacceptable 
even though they involve voluntary exchange in Nozick’s sense. For 
example, a person in urgent need of medical care but with no insurance and 
very little cash appears at a private hospital. The hospital refuses to provide 
care unless the person can demonstrate an ability to pay a reasonable fee. 
The leverage in this situation arises out of the hospital’s ability to satisfy 
the person’s interests. The exchange the hospital proposes is productive in 
Nozick’s terms—it would leave the person better off than if the hospital 
had never existed. It offers a voluntary exchange, which in Nozick’s terms 
is non-coercive. Yet most people in our society would find the refusal to 
treat a person in dire need of care morally indefensible.50 In modern 
America, there is a broad social consensus that people in need of medical 
care “ought” to be cared for, and Westen’s framework accounts for this 
kind of situation. 
Westen’s descriptive criterion—whether a proposal would leave a 
party worse off than she expects—is less well defined. Westen says that we 
measure what a party “expects” by reference to some baseline, but he never 
explains how that baseline is identified. The baseline must have an 
 
 48.  Westen, supra note 15, at 587–88 (emphasis in original). 
 49.  Id. at 586. 
 50.  See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd. EMTALA requires hospitals to provide treatment to anyone needing 
emergency care regardless of ability to pay. Id. It reflects the broad societal consensus that it 
is morally indefensible to refuse medical treatment to a person in severe distress simply 
because that person lacks financial resources. 
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objective reference point, because people may have radically different and 
irrationally self-serving expectations for what they deserve. Westen gives 
little guidance on that essential question. I will return to the question of 
expectations in discussing the legal limits on leverage in part IV. 
C.  A Note on Distributive Justice and Leverage in Negotiation 
Nozick’s conception of voluntariness rests on a view of social norms 
emphasizing liberty and strong notions of private property over other 
values. Voluntary exchanges occur when individuals act rationally and 
within the legal parameters to satisfy their interests. As scholars of law and 
economics persuasively argue, many common-law rules work to promote 
wealth-maximization through strong property rights.51 From a legal 
standpoint, an emphasis on liberty backed by strong notions of private 
property is arguably justified as a descriptive matter.52 As a prescriptive 
matter, the libertarian test of voluntariness has elegance and the relatively 
straightforward application that characterizes powerful economic 
arguments. But many members of our society find the distributive 
consequences of the libertarian emphasis on strong private property rights 
unacceptable. 
In his influential work on distributive justice and contract law, 
Anthony Kronman argues that, even for libertarians, contract law should 
work to promote distributive justice by limiting the ability of a party to 
“take advantage” of others by exploiting “superior information, intellect, or 
judgment, in the monopoly he enjoys in regard to a particular resource, or 
in his possession of a powerful instrument of violence or a gift for 
deception.”53 He offers a “paretian” limiting principle, one that “forbids us 
to grant the possessor of an advantage the exclusive right to exploit it for 
his own benefit unless those excluded from its ownership are thereby made 
better off than they would be if no one were given a greater right to the 
advantage than anyone else.”54 By focusing on the welfare of all those 
excluded from the advantage, and not just on the individuals involved in a 
particular transaction, Kronman seeks to promote overall social welfare.55 
His formula requires that “the welfare of most people who are taken 
 
 51.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 357–58 (1990). 
 52.  Id. at 359 (“It is probably no accident . . . that many common law doctrines 
assumed their modern form in the nineteenth century, when laissez-faire ideology, which 
resembles wealth maximization, had a strong hold on the Anglo-American judicial 
imagination . . . .”). 
 53.  Kronman, supra note 47, at 480. 
 54.  Id. at 493. 
 55.  See id. at 487. 
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advantage of in a particular way be increased by the kind of advantage-
taking in question.”56 
Kronman’s theory provides a test for assessing whether contract law 
promotes distributive justice at a societal level. But contract law operates 
on a case-by-case basis as courts interpret and enforce, or decline to 
enforce, specific contractual terms. Individual parties likely have little 
concern for whether judicial decisions in cases like theirs promote overall 
social welfare. They are likely to judge the distributive justice of contract 
law in relation to their own cases. Perhaps the best way to determine 
whether a minimal threshold of distributive justice has been met in a 
particular case is to ensure that basic standards of procedural justice are 
enforced. Empirical negotiation research shows that perceptions of 
procedural justice contribute directly to perceptions of distributive justice.57 
Parties that believe the process has been fair are more likely to be satisfied 
with the outcome, and to comply with it, even if the outcome is not 
objectively favorable.58 Fortified with the knowledge that parties who 
believe the process was just tend to believe their outcomes are 
distributively just, advocates of distributive justice may best achieve their 
goals by ensuring that contract law promotes procedural justice in 
bargaining. 
Most procedural justice research focuses on process involving third-
parties, such as mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.59 Recently, 
however, several studies of procedural justice in negotiation have been 
undertaken.60 They show that many of the same factors parties in third-
party processes use to assess procedural fairness also apply in negotiation. 
Specifically, parties in negotiation judge the process to be just when they 
feel they have been able to express themselves, believe they can trust the 
other party, and feel they have been treated with courtesy and respect.61 
The relative absence of rules governing these features of negotiation in 
the rules of professional conduct for lawyers is evidence of our social 
 
 56.  Id. at 487 (emphasis in original). 
 57.  See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 205 (1988); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 381, 388 (2010); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. 
L. REV. 753, 761 (2004). 
 58.  See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using 
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224 (1993); JOHN 
THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 73–74 
(1975). 
 59.  See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s 
Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 792–93 (2001). 
 60.  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 57, at 413. 
 61.  See id. at 418. 
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reticence to police negotiations to ensure that procedural justice is 
delivered.62 The marketplace is expected to regulate procedural justice in 
negotiation. There is some evidence that market-based solutions work: 
people “punish” negotiators who treat them unjustly by avoiding future 
negotiations with those unfair bargainers.63 
Contract law promotes procedural justice, and in so doing helps 
promote distributive justice, by regulating coercion. Coercion undermines 
the trust and perception of respect essential for parties to feel they have 
received procedural justice. While it is true that a test for coercion rooted in 
a libertarian understanding of voluntariness fails to capture all the factors 
contributing to distributive and procedural justice, we are unlikely to find a 
more fulsome test that would work in practice. My modest goal is to 
identify workable legal standards for assessing exercises of leverage in 
negotiation to ensure that parties are neither coerced nor taken advantage of 
in ways that violate basic social norms. As I argue in the next section, 
Nozick’s libertarian voluntariness principle, as modified by Westen’s 
addition of criteria accounting for non-libertarian views of distributive 
justice, can effectively ground that effort. 
III.  LEVERAGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF NEGOTIATION 
The philosophical literature on coercion offers important insight into 
the circumstances in which proposed exchanges are perceived as 
inappropriately coercive. Proposals suggesting a voluntary exchange are 
presumptively not coercive. They may violate norms against overreaching , 
however, if they leave a party in a position worse than it ought to be in or 
should reasonably expect to be in. Proposals threatening an action that is 
not productive are presumptively coercive. They may be acceptable if they 
would leave a party in a position that it ought to be in or reasonably should 
expect to be in. 
The distinction that Nozick draws between productive and 
unproductive activities suggests a distinction between two different types 
of leverage. Leverage that operates through the satisfaction of interests, and 
therefore proposes a voluntary exchange, is normatively different from 
leverage that operates through the imposition of costs without benefit to 
either party. Richard Shell seems to have had a similar distinction in mind 
with his categories of “positive” and “negative” leverage.64 In Shell’s 
 
 62.  See id. at 401–02 (“The rules for negotiation are few and far between, and difficult 
to enforce.”). 
 63.  See id. at 415. 
 64.  See SHELL, supra note 10, at 101–05. Shell actually identifies three types of 
leverage: positive, negative, and normative. Normative leverage, in Shell’s formulation, 
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formulation, positive leverage comes from knowledge of the other side’s 
interests and the ability to satisfy them.65 Negative leverage involves 
threats to take away something the other party has.66 
In this section, I use this basic distinction to explore the concept of 
leverage from the perspective of negotiation theory. I offer definitions of 
positive and negative leverage that rest on Nozick’s distinction. Although I 
cannot be certain that I have precisely the same understanding of these 
terms as Shell,67 I retain Shell’s terminology because I believe it captures 
an important conceptual distinction between leverage tied to the 
satisfaction of interests (positive) and leverage tied to the imposition of 
costs (negative). I then draw on Westen’s criteria to analyze cases in which 
positive leverage is inappropriate and, conversely, cases in which negative 
leverage is appropriate. 
A.  The Structure of Negotiation 
Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton showed how the 
intersecting concepts of interests and alternatives help to explain 
 
derives from the invocation of norms or criteria that the other party feels constrained to 
accept. Id. at 44. Normative leverage arises out of social norms and utilizes principled 
argument. A negotiator uses normative leverage, for example, when she makes a reasoned 
argument for why her position is fair under accepted social norms. The pressure her 
counterparty feels in that situation is rooted in the counterparty’s own sense of moral 
obligation, backed by social expectations. 
By defining leverage as power rooted in consequences, I exclude the pressure created by 
social expectations from the category of leverage. The pressure of normative leverage is 
generated internally, deriving from an individual’s need to conform his behavior to his 
perceptions of himself. It is not a product of the imposition or threat of imposition of 
consequences generated externally by the negotiating partner. As such, it raises very 
different legal and ethical issues from those raised by consequential leverage. An 
application of normative leverage will either succeed or fail, depending on the social force 
of the norms invoked and the degree to which the counterparty subscribes to those norms. 
But outside of the potential for misrepresentation, the use of normative leverage rarely 
carries the risk of legal or ethical sanction. In contrast, when parties impose or threaten to 
impose consequences on other parties, their actions can trigger a variety of legal and ethical 
considerations, from extortion to duress to unconscionability, as well as uncovering more 
subtle moral dilemmas. For these reasons, I exclude normative factors from the category of 
leverage, and focus entirely on leverage rooted in consequences. 
 65.  See id. at 102. 
 66.  See id. at 102–03. 
 67.  There may be areas in which our uses of these terms do not quite match. For 
example, Shell refers to negative leverage as “threat-based” leverage tied to taking away 
something the other side has. See SHELL, supra note 10, at 102. As I define negative 
leverage, however, it does not necessarily involve taking something away that the other side 
already has. More often it involves the threat to impose a future cost on the other side for 
pursuing its alternatives to a negotiated agreement. 
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negotiation in their groundbreaking book Getting to Yes.68 Interests–our 
needs, desires, concerns, and fears–are what motivate us.69 Interests can 
involve material goods as well as intangible goods, from the bare 
necessities of food and shelter to luxury and leisure items, to dignity, love, 
and status.70 In non-state societies, people often use violence to satisfy their 
interests. They acquire both material and psychological goods by raiding 
neighboring peoples.71 In market-based, liberal societies, people are likely 
to satisfy their interests through exchange. People negotiate trades in which 
they give things of value to others in exchange for things they value. 
Some interests are non-negotiable, however, in the sense that they are 
not available for trade. For example, human beings have deep-seated needs 
for recognition and respect. Recognition and respect are conditions for 
negotiation; they are rarely subjects of negotiation. When I agree to 
negotiate with someone, I implicitly recognize that person’s autonomy and 
worth. When I offer someone money or threaten a person with harm, I may 
be able to procure acquiescence or even subservience, but I can never know 
whether I have actually gained respect.72 
Those sorts of non-negotiable psychological interests have undeniable 
importance. They can be powerful motivators of human behavior,73 
conferring a different type of leverage than the material interests that are 
the subject of exchange. When Nozick refers to productive activities 
leading to voluntary exchange, he refers to trades of negotiable goods. The 
interests that a negotiator proposes to satisfy or to forego in a voluntary 
exchange must be interests for which the negotiator can be compensated by 
the counterparty. Normally, these will be material interests. Proposals that 
satisfy either the offeror’s or the offeree’s compensable, material interests 
are normally not coercive. 
By identifying and ranking interests (whether available in trade or not), 
a potential negotiator can make rational choices about the various 
alternative courses of action open to him. The negotiator begins by 
identifying the courses of action available to satisfy his interests. The 
alternative course of action that best satisfies the negotiator’s interests is his 
 
 68.  ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991). 
 69.  See id. at 40–41. 
 70.  For an early attempt to map out a hierarchy of basic human needs, see generally 
Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943). 
 71.  See STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS 
DECLINED 46–47 (2011). 
 72.  See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 756 (2001). 
 73.  See ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU 
NEGOTIATE 15 (2005) (describing “core concerns,” including appreciation, affiliation, 
autonomy, status, and role, that motivate negotiators). 
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“best alternative to a negotiated agreement,” or “BATNA.” A negotiator’s 
BATNA is the alternative the negotiator would resort to if he fails to reach 
agreement with the other party to the negotiation. For example, if I am 
considering purchasing a house, my alternatives include all the other 
options I have for finding a residence. Those alternatives might include 
staying in my current residence, purchasing any of several other houses, or 
renting. I identify my best alternative by prioritizing my interests—cost, 
location, size, amenities, etc.—and assessing the alternatives to find the one 
that best satisfies my interests. 
After identifying a BATNA, a negotiator can then attempt to determine 
a “reservation point” (RP), which is the point at which the negotiator 
should walk away from the table rather than reaching agreement.74 In the 
home-buying scenario, my reservation point is the value (or cost) to me of 
the best alternative living arrangement available to me. If a comparable 
home to the one I am considering is available for $250,000, I would not 
want to spend more than that on the one I am considering.75 My reservation 
point is $250,000. Reservation point is thus roughly equivalent to a 
“bottom line.” It represents the point at which a proposed agreement better 
satisfies my interests than my best alternative to that agreement.76 
Rational negotiators should prepare for a negotiation by identifying 
their BATNAs and then determining their reservation points based on those 
BATNAs.77 They should also attempt to estimate the other side’s 
reservation point. In a negotiation in which the parties are sufficiently 
adverse to resist complete transparency, much of the bargaining process 
consists of attempts to acquire information to locate the other party’s 
reservation point, while conveying the impression that a party’s own 
reservation point is more favorable than it really is.78 Arguments about the 
likelihood of successful litigation, or the availability of a comparable house 
at a lower price, represent attempts to persuade the counterparty that a 
negotiator has better alternatives than the counterparty has acknowledged.79 
Eventually, after exchanging information and arguments about the 
 
 74.  See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 
1791–92 (2000). 
 75.  I assume for purposes of simplicity that the two homes satisfy all my non-
monetary interests identically. 
 76.  Because non-quantifiable interests often trump quantifiable interests, reservation 
points are rarely susceptible to precise calculation. The concept of a reservation point has 
greatest utility in commercial negotiations and other contexts involving trades of 
quantifiable items. 
 77.  See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE 
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 22–23 (2000). 
 78.  See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1793. 
 79.  See id. at 1799. 
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alternatives available to them, the parties gain a sense (which may or may 
not be accurate) of the parameters of a possible agreement. 
A simple, zero-sum negotiation, such as a negotiation in which sales 
price is the only issue, can be visually depicted as a series of points on a 
line. The point at the far left represents a price of zero, and the point at the 
far right represents the highest possible price. The Buyer’s RP is the price 
at which the Buyer could purchase the item from an alternative source, and 
the Seller’s RP is the price the Seller could obtain from an alternative 
buyer. If the Buyer would pay more to obtain the item from an alternative 
source than the Seller could obtain from an alternative buyer, then a 
positive bargaining zone, sometimes referred to a Zone of Possible 







In such a negotiation, both parties are better off reaching a deal with 
each other than they would be going with their alternatives. The Buyer 
should be willing to pay some amount above the Seller’s RP and the Seller 
should be willing to accept some amount below the Buyer’s RP. They 
should be able to reach agreement, provided they can agree on how to 
divide the cooperative surplus represented by the ZOPA.80 For instance, in 
the home-buying example, if a comparable house is available for $250,000 
(my RP) and the seller has only one other potential purchaser, who is 
willing to pay no more than $225,000, then a positive ZOPA of $25,000 
exists. We should settle on a price somewhere between $225,000 and 
$250,000.81 
Negotiation involves two conceptually distinct activities. To use the 
familiar metaphor, the parties first determine the size and composition of 
the pie, then decide how to split it.82 Russell Korobkin labels these the 
 
 80.  See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 18–21. 
 81.  In practice, negotiations always involve both interests and emotions that cannot be 
reduced to a point on a line. The diagram is simply a useful model to understand the concept 
of cooperative surplus. 
 82.  Other negotiation scholars have used different terminology to capture this same 
basic structure. David Lax and James Sebenius, among others, distinguish attempts to create 
value from attempts to claim value. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS 
NEGOTIATOR 30–33 (1986). Charles Craver refers to the two steps as the “information stage” 
and the “distributive stage.” CHARLES B. CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATION 
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“zone-definition” stage and the “surplus allocation” stage.83 In the zone-
definition stage, the parties exchange information and make arguments in 
order to determine the zone of possible agreements. Assuming a positive 
bargaining zone exists, so both parties are able to offer the other a deal 
better than the other’s reservation point, the parties must divide the 
resulting cooperative surplus. They make offers and concessions in an 
attempt to arrive at a mutually-agreeable deal point.84 The parties might 
split the cooperative surplus evenly, or divide it with one party capturing 
more than the other. A variety of methods may be employed to allocate the 
cooperative surplus, including reference to objective criteria such as market 
prices,85 invocation of norms such as fairness,86 and reliance on power 
tactics such as claiming a lack of authority to agree to settlement points 
beyond a particular threshold.87 
Leverage can operate at the zone-definition stage and the surplus-
allocation stage. Parties begin bargaining only if they each have something 
that satisfies at least one interest of the other. The ability to satisfy the 
counterparty’s interests gives a party leverage over the counterparty. The 
value of that leverage is the compensation the party can demand in 
exchange for satisfying the counterparty’s interests. The minimum value is 
simply the party’s reservation point, and it is determined by the available 
alternatives to the negotiated agreement. In this way, leverage sets the 
bargaining zone. If a party is in a position to impose a cost on the 
counterparty, it can threaten to harm the counterparty if they do not agree 
to particular terms, choosing to pursue their BATNA instead. In that way, 
leverage can be used to establish a deal point, and may even be used to 
push a deal point outside the bargaining zone. 
B.  Defining Positive and Negative Leverage 
The distinction between positive and negative leverage is the 
distinction between the ability to satisfy the other party’s interests and the 
ability to impose costs on the other party in retaliation for the other party 
pursuing its BATNA. In Nozick’s terms, positive leverage involves trades 
 
 83.  See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1791. 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  See FISHER ET AL., supra note 68, at 85; SHELL, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
 86.  See Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165 
(Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) (“Negotiators rely upon their 
assessments of distributive and procedural fairness in making offers and demands . . . .”); 
Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1821. 
 87.  See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 213–14. 
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of productive activities, and produces voluntary exchange, while negative 
leverage involves threats of unproductive activities.88 
1.  Positive Leverage: Consequences Rooted in Interests 
Positive leverage operates through the satisfaction and refusal to 
satisfy interests. A party possessing something valuable in trade can vary 
proposed terms of exchange to induce the counterparty to add value to the 
proposed exchange. If A possesses three items that B values, A might open 
bargaining by offering only the first, and as bargaining progresses A might 
propose to add the second and third in exchange for additional concessions 
from B. Similarly, if B needs the items quickly, A might offer to speed 
delivery in exchange for concessions. By adjusting factors such as quantity, 
quality, time, price, and other conditions of exchange, A uses B’s interests 
to extract value from the exchange. These are examples of positive 
leverage, because they depend on A’s ability to satisfy B’s interests. 
If a party has the means to satisfy the interests of another, then it also 
has the power to deny satisfaction of the other’s interests. A party with 
something of value can exercise positive leverage by withholding 
agreement. Positive leverage can be wielded in ways that have negative 
consequences for the counterparty. If B is dying of thirst and A has the only 
water around, A has tremendous positive leverage over B. By withholding 
the water, A can force B to give up a great deal in exchange for satisfying 
B’s interest. 
Which party has greater positive leverage is determined primarily by 
BATNAs—the best option available to a party other than the options put 
forward by a negotiating counterparty. If the thirsty B is surrounded by 
water vendors, then he has many alternatives to dealing with A. He has a 
good BATNA, and so A’s leverage declines. If B has shelter and A is on the 
verge of dying from exposure to the sun, B has leverage over A. The extent 
of his leverage depends on the extent to which A has other alternatives for 
finding shelter. 
Positive leverage thus operates through the intersection of interests and 
alternatives. I have positive leverage if I possess something that my 
counterparty wants or needs, and I have more leverage if my counterparty 
has limited alternatives for satisfying that interest. I can deploy that 
 
 88.  In many cases, the distinction between positive leverage and negative leverage is 
roughly equivalent to the distinction between “carrots” and “sticks” in the common 
negotiation metaphor. But some common examples of positive leverage, such as strikes, 
appear to inflict harm on the counterparty and so do not comfortably fit within the carrots-
and-sticks metaphor. To avoid confusion, I also avoid the metaphor. 
KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE) SUN 2/9  9:39 PM 
122 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. XX:N 
leverage by offering to satisfy my counterparty’s interests, or by 
withholding satisfaction of his interests to extract concessions. 
Many common negotiation strategies involve positive leverage though 
they appear at first to operate through negative consequences.89  For 
example, labor strikes are an example of positive leverage. When a union 
negotiates with management over a collective bargaining agreement, it 
negotiates the terms under which it will provide its labor to management. 
Its leverage derives from its ability to satisfy the employer’s need for its 
labor. A strike is simply the withholding of that labor. The power of a 
strike derives from the power to withhold something the other side values. 
Strikes are an example of the most elemental ways of exercising 
positive leverage: patience. A negotiator with an actually or apparently 
strong BATNA can simply refuse to agree until the counterparty makes 
concessions. Patience is especially potent where the parties have different 
time preferences. For example, where one party needs funds quickly to 
satisfy some other need that party’s reservation point will diminish in value 
as time passes. The other party can favorably shift the bargaining zone by 
holding out and refusing to make concessions.90 
Commitment tactics are another common way of exercising positive 
leverage. Most commitment tactics are designed to truncate the zone of 
possible agreements by establishing that the negotiator will not accept 
terms worse than a particular threshold, even if some worse terms would be 
superior to her reservation point. One common commitment tactic involves 
emphasizing the reputational cost of agreeing to a deal that concedes a 
significant portion of the bargaining zone. For example, insurance 
companies sometimes refuse reasonable settlement offers even where 
liability is clear, in order to gain or reinforce a reputation for intransigence 
that will discourage future claims.91 In the labor relations context, a union 
negotiator may pledge to his membership not to accept terms worse than a 
certain benchmark, thereby committing himself to achieving that 
benchmark lest he incur the wrath of the members.92 Similarly, Agents 
negotiating on behalf of absent principals will often claim—either 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Rebecca Ford & Mary A. Blegen, Offensive and Defensive Use of 
Punitive Tactics in Explicit Bargaining, 55 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 351, 352 (1992) (describing 
labor strikes as a punitive tactic). 
 90.  See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1810. Korobkin characterizes the use of patience 
in this way as a form of commitment. Id. 
 91.  See Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: 
Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 
191–92 (2008). 
 92.  See FISHER ET AL., supra note 68, at 142. 
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accurately or falsely—to have limited authority to negotiate a deal beyond 
a certain amount.93 
A third method of exercising positive leverage—one that operates 
much like commitment tactics—is irrationality. Like commitments, 
irrationality represents an attempt to truncate the bargaining zone at a point 
superior to the negotiator’s reservation point. A negotiator may convince a 
counterparty that he is willing to walk away and accept an inferior 
alternative by demonstrating strong emotions, such as anger.94 Emotions 
may be deeply felt or feigned. Or a negotiator may simply refuse to 
acknowledge the weakness of her BATNA, despite all evidence or rational 
argument, to capture a greater share of the cooperative surplus than norms 
of fairness or objective factors would indicate. 
All of these tactics involve attempts to capitalize on positive leverage. 
Their efficacy comes from changing the counterparty’s perceptions of the 
value of the alternatives available to the parties. The distinguishing feature 
of these uses of positive leverage is that they cannot compel a party to enter 
into a deal that is worse than the party’s reservation point. They may 
change a party’s perception of the value of its BATNA—thereby changing 
its calculation of its reservation point—and they may lead a party to accept 
a deal that concedes most or all of the cooperative surplus to the other, but 
they cannot force a party to accept a deal worse than its reservation point. 
This does not mean positive leverage is always benign. Negotiators 
have fairly wide latitude to “bluff” and “puff” about their alternatives,95 but 
misrepresentations about material facts can constitute fraud. In one 
frequently cited case, a commercial landlord negotiating with a tenant over 
a rent increase falsely claimed that another potential tenant was willing to 
pay the requested increase and threatened eviction if the current tenant did 
not agree to the increased rate.96 In this way, the landlord fabricated 
positive leverage. The tenant agreed to the landlord’s terms, but later 
 
 93.  See DAWSON, supra note 14, at 47. Russell Korobkin characterizes commitment 
tactics as attempts to alter the bargaining zone, and thus as tactics aimed at the zone-
definition stage. Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1808. As he acknowledges, though, they can 
also be understood as attempts to claim value in the surplus allocation stage. Id. at 1817 
n.79. Either way, commitment tactics gain force from positive leverage: the negotiator 
offers to satisfy the counterparty’s interests at a level superior to the counterparty’s 
alternatives, while threatening to walk away and resort to the negotiator’s own alternatives if 
the counterparty presses for additional value. 
 94.  See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1809. 
 95.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2012) (“Estimates of price 
or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim are ordinarily [not taken as statements of material fact.]”). 
 96.  Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692, 692–93 (Mass. 1952). 
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discovered the falsehood and sued for deceit.97 The court found the 
misrepresentation actionable.98 
In cases of extreme disparities in bargaining power, positive leverage 
can be used in ways that impose what non-libertarians generally consider to 
be unacceptable hardship on a counterparty. The example of a hospital 
demanding payment from a low-income patient in dire need of care 
demonstrates that point.99 The patient needs treatment and has no real 
alternative to get it. His reservation point is effectively everything he can 
pay. The hospital can demand that the patient exhaust his resources and it 
will still be proposing a voluntary exchange because it will be offering a 
benefit better than the patient’s BATNA. But society does not condone that 
outcome. 
This is where Westen’s normative criteria for coercion—what a party 
“ought” to get—comes into play. Social norms dictate that a person in 
acute need of care should get care, regardless of ability to pay. The hospital 
is not acting within its rights to demand that the patient exhaust his 
resources even though that option is better than the patient’s alternatives. I 
return to this topic later in my discussion of the doctrines of duress and 
unconscionability to show how the law protects against overreaching 
deployments of positive leverage. 
2.  Negative Leverage: Consequences Rooted in Costs 
Negative leverage, like positive leverage, is tied to the concept of 
alternatives, but in a different way. Negative leverage arises out of the 
ability to impose retributive costs on a counterparty if the counterparty 
pursues its BATNA. In its most crude form, negative leverage could 
involve a threat to do bodily harm. In my example above, A could threaten 
to kill B if B does not buy A’s water instead of buying water from another 
vendor. Here A’s interest is in selling his water and B’s interest is in 
receiving water at the most reasonable price. A’s proposed course of 
conduct—killing B—serves the interests of neither. Its sole purpose is to 
impose a cost on B to discourage B from pursuing his BATNA.100 
 
 97.  Id. at 693. 
 98.  Id. at 695. 
 99.  See Francis J. Serbaroli, The Federal “Patient Dumping” Prohibition, N.Y. L.J., 
Dec. 3, 1993, at 3. 
 100.  A might also have an irrational desire to harm B. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 
77, at 166 (noting that “emotions cloud a party’s judgment and make it more difficult to 
reach agreement” and that “anger, resentment, and revenge may motivate litigants more than 
rationality.”). Following most negotiation models, I exclude the possibility of A’s irrational 
desire to harm B from my analysis of A’s legitimate interests. See id. at 174-75 (advocating 
that lawyers adopt problem-solving strategies to encourage rational value-creation). 
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In practice, people use negative leverage more often than negotiation 
literature tends to acknowledge. Some uses of negative leverage are 
considered benign, while others raise serious moral and legal concerns. 
Consider the case of Anthony Digati. Digati, a former insurance agent with 
New York Life, believed he had been misled into paying $49,500 in 
premiums for a variable life insurance policy he didn’t want.101  He 
demanded that the company refund his premiums, and when it declined, he 
decided to escalate matters. He created a website called 
NewYorkLifeProducts.com, on which he attacked New York Life for 
misleading the public. Then he sent a series of e-mails to New York Life 
officers demanding $198,303.88, or quadruple his paid premiums. He told 
the officers that if they did not pay that amount by a given date, he would 
launch an e-mail spam campaign against the company, sending out two 
million negative e-mails every day for three weeks.102 
Digati was subsequently arrested in California, a federal magistrate 
judge finding probable cause to believe he engaged in extortion.103 His 
attempt at leverage failed because he crossed a relatively bright line. 
Spamming of the type Digati contemplated is illegal, and so is a threat to 
engage in spamming.104  But had he stopped short of his spam threat and 
simply created a website on which he aired his grievances with New York 
Life, he probably would have provoked little reaction from New York Life 
and none from the local prosecutor’s office. Assuming he did not post false 
information, posting complaints about the company would have been an 
unremarkable activity. Dozens of websites exist for the sole purpose of 
allowing customers to post complaints about companies. A consumer who 
threatens a business with a bad review on Angie’s List unless the business 
redresses a legitimate grievance has done nothing wrong, as long as the 
review is not defamatory.105 If the business owner agrees to redress that 
grievance to avoid the bad review, no court will void the agreement. 
 
 101.  See Alison Gendar, Anthony Digati Arrested for Allegedly Threatening New York 
Life with Email Spam Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, March 8, 2010. 
 102.  See Warren Richey, How a Client Tried to Extort an Insurance Giant – And 
Failed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 22, 2010. Digati told New York Life that if his 
deadline passed without payment, his demand would increase to $3 million. “I am going to 
cause you millions of dollars in lost revenue, good faith and general trust in your company,” 
he said in the e-mail. “I have absolutely nothing to lose or any fear of retaliation, no judge in 
the world is going to rule for a 200 billion dollar company when there is a lonely customer 
that you stole from.” Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-
SPAM) Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012). 
 105.  See Shauna L. Spinosa, Yelp! Libel or Free Speech: The Future of Internet 
Defamation Litigation in Massachusetts in the Wake of Noonan v. Staples, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. 
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Negative leverage is a regular and unremarkable feature of labor 
negotiations. I explained above why a labor strike is an example of positive 
leverage—it operates by withholding the thing that the other side values. In 
contrast, picketing is an example of negative leverage. The picketing is 
designed to generate community pressure on the recalcitrant employer. Its 
purpose is to impose an exogenous cost on the employer if the employer 
resorts to its alternative, which is typically either to stop work entirely or to 
employ replacement workers. 
The distinguishing feature of negative leverage is its detachment from 
the satisfaction of negotiable interests. Picketing is not something that the 
employer desires in trade, and standing alone, it does not satisfy the union’s 
interests in attaining particular working conditions. Except for the pressure 
it can put on the employer, picketing serves no material purpose for the 
union members, and in fact involves a cost to them (they must spend their 
time walking a picket line instead of engaging in other productive activity). 
At most, the picketing allows the employees to express their frustration in a 
public way. Its only benefit to them—again, divorced from its potential to 
influence the employer’s conduct—is the psychological benefit that union 
members may feel of standing up for themselves and taking retaliatory 
action, and whatever deterrent benefit they get from retribution. 
A proposal employs negative leverage if the proposed conduct, 
standing alone, does not serve the offeree’s interests and serves no interests 
of the offeror other than (non-negotiable) psychological interests and the 
deterrent effects of retribution. Consider a different picketing example 
related in Getting Past No. Ury describes a negotiation in which a group of 
tenants attempted to persuade their landlord to repair their broken 
plumbing. When the landlord refused, the tenants picketed in front of his 
suburban home, causing his neighbors to pressure him to take action to 
mollify the tenants and stop the picketing.106 
Ury cites this as an example of effective use of an alternative—the 
tenants’ alternative to negotiating being picketing. That suggests this is an 
example of positive leverage. While picketing was an ‘alternative’ for the 
tenants, it was not an alternative in the BATNA sense. A BATNA is a 
course of action that a party would take to satisfy her interests if she is 
unable to reach agreement with the other party. It is the substitute for the 
proposed agreement. In Ury’s example, the tenants’ interest is having a 
place to live with working plumbing. Their alternatives for achieving that 
interest include pursuing judicial or administrative processes that could 
 
REV. 747, 754–55 (2011) (citing cases in which online reviewers have been sued for 
defamation). 
 106.  See WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO 147 (1991). 
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legally compel the landlord to fix the plumbing, taking other action such as 
fixing it themselves, or moving to a different building. 
If the tenants had numerous other apartments available to which they 
could move, or a very strong legal case, they would have good alternatives 
and positive leverage. Picketing the landlord’s home, in contrast, is a 
pressure tactic used in conjunction with the negotiation to compel the 
landlord to reach agreement on terms favorable to the tenants. Standing 
alone, it satisfied neither the landlord’s nor the tenants’ material interests. 
Picketing benefited the tenants solely because it allowed them to impose a 
cost on the landlord for pursuing his best alternative, which was to do 
nothing. It constituted negative leverage because the leverage was rooted in 
costs imposed rather than interests satisfied. 
In sum, the purpose of negative leverage is to compel the other side to 
agree on terms that are not dictated either by the available alternatives or by 
other factors, such as charisma, fairness or objective criteria. It increases 
the costs of not reaching agreement. A party may become willing to accept 
terms that are worse for that party than the deal points that would otherwise 
guide resolution. To the extent that negative leverage benefits the party 
employing it, the benefits are psychological and/or indirect, in the form of 
deterrence. 
Psychological benefits are hardly unimportant. They routinely take 
precedence over material interests. Game theory studies show that people 
will decline material benefits when they feel they are being treated unfairly. 
For example, in ultimatum games two players are offered an amount of 
money. One player in the dyad is given the authority to propose a division 
of the money between them. If the other accepts the proposed division, 
both players get the money. But neither gets any money unless the other 
agrees to the proposed division.107 In these games, people often reject a 
proposed division—thereby depriving themselves and the other party of a 
windfall benefit—if they feel that the proposed division is unfairly one-
sided.108 
People often attach similar importance to retribution or revenge.109 
They feel a need to punish one who they feel has harmed them, and they 
 
 107.  See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 
753, 753 (2004). 
 108.  See Paul Pecorino & Mark van Boening, Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum 
Game, 53 J. LAW & ECON. 263, 263 (2010) (summarizing results of laboratory ultimatum 
games in which recipients routinely refuse offers of less than one-third of the surplus). 
 109.  See Noreen Stuckless & Richard Goranson, The Vengeance Scale: Development of 
a Measure of Attitudes Towards Revenge, 7 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 25, 26 (1992) 
(distinguishing between retribution and revenge). 
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get psychological satisfaction from doing so.110 In addition to the psychic 
benefits it offers through the assertion of autonomy and defense of honor, 
retribution serves an important deterrent function. Retaliation in response 
to an attack makes clear to both the attacker and the world that future 
hostile action will entail costs for the initiator.111 Parties who fail to 
retaliate against attacks may encourage further attacks, costing them in the 
long run.112 
Beyond immediate psychic and deterrence benefits to those who 
employ them, exercises of negative leverage can have important social 
benefits. “Altruistic punishment” is critical to successful human 
cooperation.113 The willingness of individuals to punish others, even at a 
cost to themselves, for uncooperative behavior helps to promote 
cooperation generally.114 Negative leverage is not necessarily bad. In fact, 
it appears to be essential in some contexts. 
However, many exercises of negative leverage violate social norms 
against coercion. In Westen’s terms, a person should not be left worse off 
than she would have expected to be in the absence of the proposal 
employing the leverage.115 So what does a party have a right to expect? At 
a minimum, she has a right to expect that, at the end of the negotiation, she 
will not be worse off than she would have been if the negotiation had not 
taken place at all. If she had never negotiated with the other party, she 
would have pursued her best available alternative. Her expectations are tied 
to her BATNA. A party is entitled to expect a bargain that is no worse than 
its best alternative to a proposed agreement. A party should not be coerced 
into accepting a deal worse than its reservation point would be in the 
absence of the costs imposed by the counterparty through the use of 
negative leverage. A deployment of negative leverage that merely pressures 
the counterparty to accept a deal point within the zone of possible 
agreements can transgress a variety of social norms, but it does not rise to 
the level of coercion.116 
 
 110.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 309 (1831) (“Every kind of 
satisfaction, as it is a punishment to the offender, naturally produces a pleasure of vengeance 
to the injured party.”). 
 111.  See Ford & Blegen, supra note 89, at 352. 
 112.  See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE 
EMOTIONS 29–37 (1988). 
 113.  See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 
137, 138–39 (2002). 
 114.  Id. at 137–38. 
 115.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 116.  See Ford & Blegen, supra note 89, at 352 (discussing offensive and defensive uses 
of punitive negotiation tactics). In some situations, such as the case involving the striking 
tenants, a party uses negative leverage to level the playing field against a negotiating partner 
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I do not mean to suggest that a formalist algorithm built to spot 
reservation points will precisely determine the moment when an exercise of 
negative leverage crosses a line into inappropriate coercion. The values we 
attach to our interests and alternatives are far too variable.117 Furthermore, 
the concept of a stable reservation point falls apart in multi-party 
negotiations.118 Particularly in commercial cases, however, reservation 
points are often available in the form of market prices. Even in more 
complex cases, conceptualizing limits on negative leverage in terms of 
BATNAs and reservation points can help both ethical and legal evaluators 
make judgments about when the use of negative leverage should be 
considered illegitimate. I argue when discussing the contract doctrine of 
duress that courts make these judgments, whether or not they consciously 
apply this methodology. 
C.  The Borderland Between Positive and Negative Leverage 
Because both positive and negative leverage are linked to the value of 
the parties’ alternatives, many uses of leverage involve positive and 
negative elements. Litigation is an example. Negotiation texts commonly 
refer to litigation as a BATNA because settlement and litigation are the 
alternative ways for the plaintiff to receive compensation for his injuries.119 
From an economic standpoint, a litigation settlement is a sales transaction 
in which the plaintiff “sells” his cause of action to the defendant.120  In 
theory, the parties work out a settlement with reference to the value of the 
cause of action, measured in terms of the expected recovery and the costs 
of pursuing adjudication.121  The defendant can affect the costs of pursuing 
adjudication by defending more or less vigorously. Since the pursuit of 
 
who she perceives to be employing power tactics to gain a disproportionate share of the 
cooperative surplus. “Fighting fire with fire” in that way would not violate the party-
expectation norm because the counterparty has no right to expect any particular outcome 
within the zone of possible agreements. 
 117.  See Noah Susskind, Wiggle Room: Rethinking Reservation Values in Negotiation, 
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 79, 88 (2011) (explaining difference between “decided” and 
“revealed” reservation values). Fisher, Ury, and Patton, who created BATNA, never used 
the term “reservation point,” even in their revised edition with Bruce Patton, though the 
term was in wide circulation at that time. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another 
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754, 769 
(1984). 
 118.  See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 308 (2d ed. 2009). 
 119.  See Korobkin, supra note 16, at 868. 
 120.  See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
 121.  See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
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litigation is the defendant’s BATNA, as well as the plaintiff’s, this is a 
form of positive leverage. On the other hand, the potential exists for the 
defendant to engage in litigation conduct that would be unnecessary for the 
effective maintenance of its defense and pursued solely to increase the 
costs to the plaintiff of pursuing litigation. This is an example of negative 
leverage.122 
For litigation, the line between positive and negative leverage is hazy. 
A minimum level of litigation activity is both required and expected when 
parties contest disputed claims. Judicial decisions are required, discovery 
taken, motions filed, and experts hired and prepared. These activities cost 
money for all parties. Accordingly, some reasonable litigation cost must 
always be factored in when determining the “value” of the claim that is the 
subject matter of the negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Simply by asserting its right to pursue a claim or defense, a party 
changes the value of the cause of action being sold by the plaintiff and 
bought by the defendant. Litigation activity in this sense is a form of 
positive leverage. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the pursuit of 
frivolous claims or defenses constitutes negative leverage. To the extent no 
genuine claim or defense is at stake, settlement negotiations do not involve 
anything of actual value to either party. The sole purpose of frivolous 
litigation is to impose a cost on a party for pursuing its litigation 
alternative.123  Much litigation conduct falls between those extremes, and it 
can be difficult to tell whether litigation conduct is necessary for the 
assertion of a claim or defense or is frivolous overkill. Litigation conduct in 
that middle band carries elements of both positive and negative leverage.124 
 
 122.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 42 (discussing frivolous litigation as an 
instance of contractual duress). 
 123.  See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement 
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2004) (“Civil 
litigants often exploit the litigation process strategically for private gain at the expense of 
social welfare. One of the most troubling abuses concerns ‘frivolous’ litigation, and 
particularly litigation aimed at obtaining a ‘nuisance-value settlement.’ To employ a 
nuisance-value strategy, a litigant asserts a plainly meritless claim or defense in order to 
extract a payoff based on the cost the other party would incur to have the claim or defense 
dismissed by the court under a standard dispositive motion, like summary judgment.”) For 
an examination of the incentives at work in nuisance suits, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing 
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988). 
 124.  Counterclaims often appear to be instances of negative leverage. For example, in 
the late-1990s intellectual property battle between Digital Equipment Corp., a computer 
manufacturer, and Intel, a maker of processors, Digital sued Intel alleging patent 
infringement. Intel counterclaimed, asserting that Digital misappropriated Intel’s 
technology. It seems unlikely that Intel would have brought an independent action against 
Digital for misappropriation, because that claim was tenuous at best. But asserting the 
counterclaim increased Digital’s costs of pursuing its litigation alternative, conferring 
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The line between positive and negative leverage can also be nebulous 
in many bargaining situations outside of litigation. Richard Shell gives as 
an example of effective negative leverage a bargaining ploy Donald Trump 
used when he was seeking to build his Trump Tower in New York City.125  
Trump needed the air rights over the building occupied by Tiffany & Co. 
Tiffany did not want to sell. Trump presented Tiffany’s ownership with 
two options. If granted the air rights, he promised to build an attractive 
building melding with the original architecture. If he was not granted the 
air rights, he claimed he would be forced by zoning regulations to build a 
monstrously ugly building overshadowing Tiffany. Tiffany granted the air 
rights. 
If constructing the ugly building was Trump’s best alternative to the 
proposal including air rights—then this was an example of positive 
leverage. The proposal Trump offered was his alternative means of 
satisfying his interests. On the other hand, if Trump concocted the story—if 
the ugly building he described would not have satisfied his interests 
because other, better options were available—it was an example of 
negative leverage. The sole purpose of the proposal was to impose a cost 
on Tiffany for pursuing its alternatives. Constructing the ugly building 
would not benefit either Trump or Tiffany. 
Though positive and negative leverage are not separated by a bright 
line, the distinction is important from both a moral and a legal perspective. 
Because negative leverage can be used to pressure a party to accept a deal 
worse than its reservation point, negative leverage carries coercive power 
that positive leverage does not. Positive leverage carries a different set of 
risks, primarily the risk of abuse of power. In the next section, I will show 
how the contract doctrines of duress and unconscionability have evolved to 
place different legal strictures on these two types of leverage. 
IV.  LIMITS ON LEVERAGE IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT: DURESS AND 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
As a legal matter, negotiations are regulated primarily after the fact by 
contract law. Rules of professional responsibility dictate certain minimal 
requirements for the conduct of negotiations—no misrepresentations of 
material fact,126 no threats of criminal prosecution in the negotiation of 
civil disputes127—but these rules offer very little specific guidance and 
 
negative leverage on Intel. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 243–45 (describing 
dispute between Digital and Intel). 
 125.  SHELL, supra note 10, at 103. 
 126.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983). 
 127.  See NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(3) (2009). 
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apply only to lawyer-negotiators. The criminal law provides some limits on 
the use of threats and blackmail,128 but it leaves the vast majority of 
negotiation behaviors unregulated. Negotiators typically learn their 
bargaining practices violated a legal norm only when a court intercedes to 
declare an agreement unenforceable—because it was reached on the basis 
of fraud, mistake, duress, unconscionability, or undue influence129—or to 
impose an obligation in the absence of formal agreement based on the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel.130 
In the law of contracts, the two doctrines that most directly regulate the 
use of power in negotiation are the doctrines of duress and 
unconscionability.131 In general, courts enforce contracts even where 
substantial disparities in bargaining power result in one-sided 
agreements.132 The doctrines of duress and unconscionability are 
exceptions to that rule. They give courts a legal justification to refuse 
enforcement of negotiated agreements on the basis of abusive bargaining 
tactics. 
The doctrines of duress and unconscionability developed separately 
along parallel tracks—duress in the courts of law and unconscionability in 
equity. Up through the 18
th
 century, duress was a defense to contract only if 
an agreement was coerced by threats of actual, serious physical harm, such 
as imprisonment or loss of life or limb.133 Threats of less serious harms, 
such as economic harms, were not grounds for relief.134 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, courts allowed parties to escape contractual 
 
 128.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962). 
 129.  See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 273–341 (6th ed. 
2009). 
 130.  See id. at 218–36. 
 131.  Duress and unconscionability are by no means the only doctrines used to regulate 
behavior in contract negotiation. Undue influence is another doctrine that protects weaker 
parties against overreaching. See id. at 286–91. Undue influence claims typically involve 
disparities in capacity, with the stronger party taking advantage of the weaker party’s 
reduced capacity. They often involve special duties. For example, many legal relationships, 
such as principal-agent, trustee-beneficiary, or guardian-ward, carry special obligations on 
the dominant party that do not apply in arms-length transactions. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981). I focus on duress and unconscionability because 
they most directly relate to improper uses of bargaining power in arms-length negotiations 
where no special duties are present. 
 132.  See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 144 (2005) (“Courts rarely overturn contracts on the basis of . . . doctrines explicitly 
employing inequality of bargaining power as an element, and inequality of bargaining 
power alone is not a sufficient justification for judicial intervention into contract disputes.”). 
 133.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 273; WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 23 (quoting 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND). 
 134.  Id. 
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agreements on grounds of purely economic duress.135 In a leading case, 
Justice Holmes famously described the test of duress as follows: “If a party 
obtains a contract by creating a motive from which the other party ought to 
be free, and which in fact is and is known to be sufficient to produce the 
result, it does not matter that the motive would not have prevailed with a 
differently constituted person, whether the motive be a fraudulently created 
belief or an unlawfully created fear.”136 
Unconscionability emerged in equity as an all-purpose vehicle for 
protection against oppressive bargains.137 The doctrines of undue influence, 
misrepresentation, and mistake were initially conceived in equity as 
particularized applications of a more general concept of 
unconscionability.138 As these principles migrated into contract law as free-
standing doctrines, unconscionability remained a hazy concept until it was 
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.139 It has since been 
incorporated into the law of contracts generally.140 As the comment to 
U.C.C. § 2-302 states, “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or 
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under 
the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”141 
 
 135.  John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 241 (1942). 
 136.  Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555, 556 (Mass. 1898). 
 137.  See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3rd Cir. 1948) (“That equity 
does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require elaborate 
citation.”). 
 138.  In the 1970s, the English courts briefly attempted to fuse these various legal and 
equitable doctrines—duress, unconscionability, undue influence, etc.—into a single 
contractual defense based on “inequality of bargaining power.” See Barnhizer, supra note 
132, at 145. In the words of Lord Denning, “[T]he English law gives relief to one who, 
without independent advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or 
transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining 
power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance 
or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the 
benefit of the other.” Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 (C.A.) 339 (Lord 
Denning M.R.).  
 139.  See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). U.C.C. § 2-302 provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contra ct, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977). 
 140.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 141.  Professor Leff, whose analysis has shaped judicial interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-
302 for decades, criticized this section for its failure to adequately define unconscionability. 
See Leff, supra note 139, at 487. (“If reading this section makes anything clear it is that 
reading this section alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of ‘unconscionable’ 
except perhaps that it is pejorative.”). 
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The tests of duress and unconscionability share an underlying 
impulse—protecting a weaker party from overreaching by a stronger 
party—but they emphasize different considerations. Duress focuses on the 
reasons why the weaker party accepted a particular deal and the nature of 
the threatened conduct. It requires the weaker party to prove that it acted in 
fear of some unjustified action.142 Unconscionability focuses on the 
relationship between the parties and the reasonableness of the bargain. It 
relieves a weaker party of grossly unfair obligations where the weaker 
party either did not understand the terms or had no real choice but to accept 
because it had no better alternatives.143 For duress, the emphasis is on 
whether the agreement was coerced; for unconscionability, the emphasis is 
on whether the agreement was unfair.144 
On this distinction, Alan Wertheimer offers a useful contrast between 
causing the counterparty’s lack of options and taking advantage of the 
counterparty’s lack of options.145 Duress requires coercion. A party 
engages in coercion when it causes the counterparty’s dilemma by taking 
improper action to increase the cost to the counterparty of pursuing an 
otherwise available alternative. When the counterparty lacks options 
because of forces beyond the control of either party, no coercion is 
involved, although the party in the superior position may take advantage of 
the other’s weakness in unacceptable ways. It may be unconscionable to 
take advantage of another’s weakness, but it does not seem like duress. 
Neither the case law nor the drafters of the Restatement maintain a 
precise distinction between duress and unconscionability along the lines I 
suggest because unconscionability has only crystallized as a contract law 
defense in the last half-century.146 Most case law before the last few 
 
 142.  See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (N.J. 1956) (“[D]uress is tested, 
not by the nature of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the 
victim.”). 
 143.  See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (describing an 
unconscionable contract as one “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”). Id. 
 144.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 21–22. Consistent with court decisions prior to 
the last few decades of the twentieth century, Wertheimer analyzes both contract defenses 
based on improper conduct in the negotiating process and contract defenses based on the 
unfairness of the resulting bargain under the rubric of duress. My argument that the former 
should be placed under the rubric of duress and the latter under the rubric of 
unconscionability is based on recent case law and reflect an attempt to bring logical 
consistency to the doctrines. 
 145.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 39–40. 
 146.  Some courts mix duress and unconscionability in the same analysis. In United 
States v. Bedford Assocs., 491 F. Supp. 851, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found a contract 
voidable using this reasoning: 
By misrepresenting the extent of competition, by threatening in bad faith to exercise the 
second option, by misleading Bedford as to the availability of further negotiations, and by 
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decades treated all contract defenses based on improper use of leverage as 
duress.147 The modern development of these doctrines suggests an 
understanding of the different circumstances in which leverage can be 
misused that is consistent with my approach. I argue that duress is best 
understood as the misuse of negative leverage and that unconscionability is 
best understood as the misuse of positive leverage. A contract is void due 
to misuse of negative leverage either where the threatened conduct is itself 
wrongful or where a party uses negative leverage to pressure the other 
party into an unfair agreement. A contract is void due to misuse of positive 
leverage where a stronger party forces a party with no real alternatives to 
accept an agreement that violates social norms. 
A.  Duress: The Improper Use of Negative Leverage 
Under the doctrine of duress a party may avoid its contractual 
obligations by showing it was improperly coerced into entering the 
agreement.148 In the words of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “[i]f 
a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the 
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim.”149  The Restatement formulation incorporates two 
key features: a party’s choices must be unreasonably constrained, and the 
proposal constraining the party’s choices must be improper. 
Wertheimer, analyzing the parallel language from the first Restatement 
of Contracts,150 refers to these as the “proposal” prong and the “choice” 
prong.151 The proposal prong recognizes that a person’s choices are often 
constrained by the actions of others in legitimate ways. A person should be 
able to escape the consequences of her volitional acts only when 
“improper” pressure has left her with no reasonable alternatives.152 The 
 
engaging in other wrongful acts, the Government placed Bedford in an extremely precarious 
position financially and deprived Bedford of any real choice of action. Under these 
circumstances, the Government’s conduct constituted duress. The Government’s wrongful 
actions during the negotiations taken in conjunction with the one-sidedness of the terms of 
the alleged new lease render the alleged new lease unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable. 
 147.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 23–28 (collecting cases raising duress defenses 
from 1881–1978). 
 148.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 274 (“Today the general rule is that any wrongful 
act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.”). 
 149.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
 150.  See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932). 
 151.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 30 (arguing that duress as defined in the 
Restatement involves a two-prong analysis that focuses on the voluntariness of the 
recipient’s choices and the moral legitimacy of the proposal). 
 152.  See id. John Dalzell makes this point when he argues that duress consists of two 
necessary and sufficient elements: “1) the transaction must be induced by a wrongful threat, 
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choice prong arises out of the fundamental principle of duress: a person 
does not act under duress if she had reasonable alternatives to the course of 
action she took, but declined to pursue them. 
1.  The Proposal Prong 
Under the proposal prong, threats support a duress defense only if they 
are “improper.” The second Restatement lists two categories of improper 
threats. First, the Restatement provides that a threat is improper if the 
proposed course of action is itself illegal or otherwise so shocking that no 
inquiry into the fairness of the resulting bargain is required.153 Second, a 
threat can be improper even if the threatened conduct is not inherently 
wrongful, as long as the resulting bargain is “not on fair terms.”154 
Duress of the first type seems to require analysis under the proposal 
prong without consideration of the choice prong. That is true where a 
proposal threatens the commission of a crime or tort, such as perpetrating 
physical violence or property damage. Threats to engage in conduct that is 
itself illegal or inherently improper constitute negative leverage because a 
bargain based on such a threat does not constitute a voluntary exchange. 
Little analysis is required to conclude that an agreement entered into under 
threat of criminal conduct should not be enforced. Negative leverage that 
employs such threats violates norms against coercion without the need to 
evaluate the terms of the resulting bargain.155 
But certain instances of the first type of duress in fact require 
assessment of the terms of the deal, because they incorporate criminal laws 
that depend in part on a showing of financial harm. Most notably, threats to 
engage in conduct that meets the test of extortion under applicable criminal 
law constitute the first type of duress.156 Extortion statutes typically require 
that the threatening conduct be employed for the purpose of obtaining the 
“property” of the victim.157 For example, the Hobbs Act defines extortion 
as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by 
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color 
 
2) for which the law offers no adequate remedy, that is, no remedy which (by practical 
layman’s standards, not those of the common-law or even of equity) is really sufficient to 
compensate for the wrong suffered if the threat should be carried out.” Dalzell, supra note 
135, at 240. 
 153.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981). 
 154.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981). 
 155.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 276. 
 156.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. b (1981). 
 157.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962) (“A person is guilty of theft if he 
purposely obtains property of another by threatening to” engage in enumerated acts). 
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of official right.”158 In United States v. Enmons,159 the United States 
Supreme Court held that extortion under the Hobbs Act “consists of the use 
of wrongful means to achieve a wrongful objective.”160 Even if the 
threatened conduct is not itself illegal, the use of fear to obtain property 
constitutes extortion when “the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim” to 
the property.161 
Federal courts have applied that section to assess deployments of 
leverage in negotiation. In Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Icahn,162 corporate raider 
Carl Icahn purchased a number of shares in Viacom and then threatened a 
hostile takeover unless Viacom purchased those shares back at a price 
higher than market value.163 Viacom agreed to Icahn’s terms and then sued 
to recover the difference between the price it paid Icahn and the market 
value.164 Noting that this sort of “greenmail” is not inherently unlawful, the 
court held that “[w]hat converts otherwise lawful business activity into 
‘wrongful means’ is the use of that activity to obtain property to which 
defendants have no lawful claim.”165 The court used this test to distinguish 
between “hard bargaining” and extortion: 
In a “hard-bargaining” scenario the alleged victim has no pre-existing 
right to pursue his business interests free of the fear he is quelling by 
receiving value in return for transferring property to the defendant, but in 
an extortion scenario the alleged victim has a pre-existing entitlement to 
pursue his business interests free of the fear he is quelling by receiving 
value in return for transferring property to the defendant.”166 
In other words, to be deprived of “property” by “wrongful means” is to 
be pressured into an agreement that concedes value that the threatened 
party could not have been required to concede in the absence of the 
threatening proposal. A party should not be pressured, by threats of force, 
violence, or fear, into accepting a deal worse than it could have gotten by 
pursuing its best alternative to an agreement with the threatening party. So 
even though the Restatement indicates that proposals that are extortionate 
under the relevant criminal law are improper without consideration of the 
 
 158.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012). 
 159.  410 U.S. 396 (1973). 
 160.  Id. at 400. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 163.  Id. at 207. 
 164.  Id. at 209. Viacom sued under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO). 18 U.S.C. § 1962. To prevail under RICO, Viacom had to prove 
that Icahn engaged in an illegal predicate act. Id. It alleged both securities fraud and 
extortion under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 210.  
 165.  Id. at 211–12. 
 166.  Id. at 213 (internal citations omitted). 
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fairness of the resulting deal, the test of extortion can require analysis of 
the terms of the resulting deal. 167 
The second type of duress provided for in the Restatement rests on 
similar principles. Under that test, conduct that is not inherently wrongful is 
improper if the resulting bargain is “not on fair terms.”168 This language 
appears to ignore the proposal prong entirely. But in context, the 
Restatement language suggests something else is intended.169 Specifically, 
the section provides that the circumstances in which a bargain is not on fair 
terms includes cases where “the threatened act would harm the recipient 
and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.”170 This is 
a description of negative leverage. Negative leverage arises out of 
proposals that impose costs on the counterparty for pursuing its alternatives 
without offering any material benefit to the party making the proposal. 
Negative leverage involves proposals that “would harm the recipient and 
would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.”171 
Duress, like its criminal counterpart, extortion, depends on a 
demonstration of coercion.172 I argue that only negative leverage is 
 
 167.  See Id. The court in Viacom found no extortion because the plaintiff had no right 
to be free of a takeover by Icahn. “Here, plaintiff received something of value in return for 
its consideration: Plaintiff’s transfer of property to defendants enabled plaintiff to receive an 
eleven year standstill covenant from defendants and 3,498,200 shares of common stock, 
thereby assuring that Viacom  would be relieved of its fear of suffering damage caused by 
the threat of a takeover by defendants.” Id. Icahn was engaging in positive leverage; there 
was no coercion and no extortion. 
 168.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981). 
 169.  In practice, courts have not relied on section 176(2) to police the substantive 
fairness or unfairness of agreements. See Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the 
Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443, 485 (2005). Professor Giesel describes 
section 176(2) as a failed experiment for that reason. Id. If section 176(2) is understood in 
the way I suggest, however, it makes sense as a description of much of the case law, even if 
courts do not invoke it.  
 170.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1981). The additional listed 
grounds are where “(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent 
is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or (c) what 
is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.” Id. § 176(2)(b)–(c). In my 
analysis, these categories are better understood as misuses of positive leverage and so are 
better considered examples of unconscionability. 
 171.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 176(1) (1981). 
 172.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962). Many state extortion statutes incorporate 
language to the Restatement test for duress. New York’s extortion statute, for example, 
provides that “a person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another 
person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a 
fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will” take one of nine 
enumerated actions, including causing physical injury, engaging in other conduct 
constituting a crime, accusing a person of a crime, or “perform[ing] any other act which 
would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another 
person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial 
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coercive, and the tests for both extortion and duress are consistent with that 
view. These tests require either that threatening conduct be inherently 
wrongful or that it harm the threatened party without benefitting the 
threatening party. Since not all uses of negative leverage are improperly 
coercive—picketing and posting negative online reviews being two 
commonly accepted examples—the test for duress must distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable uses of negative leverage. This is 
where the choice prong comes into play. 
2.  The Choice Prong 
In applying the choice prong, courts historically required that the party 
seeking relief demonstrate an “overborne will.”173 The problem with this 
formulation is that, in the absence of physical coercion, the threatened party 
manifestly made a choice to accept the proposed bargain.174 It exercised 
volition in choosing among bad options. Most modern commentators, 
including the Restatement, take the position that a better analysis asks 
whether the threatened party had a reasonable alternative to agreement.175 
Even courts nominally applying the overborne-will standard often focus on 
the irrationality of the bargain. In Gallagher v. Robinson, for example, the 
court defined duress as being “tantamount to compulsion which is an 
impulse or feeling of being irresistibly driven toward the performance of 
some irrational action.”176 
Duress cases involve allegations of undue pressure put on a negotiator 
to accept a particular set of terms. The threatened party accepted a 
particular set of terms instead of choosing to go with its BATNA. In the 
context of negotiation, a decision to accept a particular set of terms is 
irrational—it is not what a reasonable person would do—when that set of 
terms is worse than the negotiator’s reservation point. By definition, a 
reservation point is the point at which a rational negotiator walks away 
from the table because the proposed bargain is worse than the best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement. The choice prong of duress captures 
cases in which the threatened party agreed to terms worse than its 
 
condition, reputation or personal relationships.” See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05  (McKinney 
2012). 
 173.  See Giesel, supra note 169, at 469–71. 
 174.  Id. at 471. 
 175.  See Meredith R. Miller, Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in Economic Duress, 
Contract Modification and Framing, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 357, 440 (2006); WERTHEIMER, 
supra note 20, at 36; P.S. Atiyah, Economic Duress and the “Overborne Will”, 98 L. Q. 
REV. 197, 201 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
 176.  Gallagher v. Robinson, 232 N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1965). 
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reservation point. In effect, the evidence of an “overborne will” is precisely 
that: an agreement to terms worse than the negotiator’s reservation point.177 
3.  Application of the Doctrine 
The doctrine of duress has been criticized for lacking consistency and 
clarity.178 A coherent duress doctrine emerges if the proposal prong is 
understood to capture exercises of negative leverage and the choice prong 
is understood to capture agreements that fall outside the zone of possible 
agreements. Duress entails negative leverage used to extract a deal worse 
than the threatened party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement. 
The Restatement gives the following illustration that conforms to that 
understanding: 
A makes a threat to B, his former employee, that he will try to prevent 
B’s employment elsewhere unless B agrees to release a claim that he has 
against A. B, having no reasonable alternative, is thereby induced to make 
the contract. If the court concludes that the attempt to prevent B’s 
employment elsewhere would harm B and would not significantly benefit 
A, A’s threat is improper and the contract is voidable by B.179 
The above illustration is based on Perkins Oil v. Fitzgerald,180 
although the facts of Fitzgerald are slightly different. Fitzgerald was an 
employee of Perkins Oil. He was injured on the job, as a result of which 
injury both of his arms were amputated.181 Perkins offered him $5,000 in 
compensation, which was the maximum of the company’s insurance 
coverage. At the same time, Perkins threatened to fire and then blackball 
 
 177.  As I suggested in discussing extortion under the proposal prong, extortion also 
seems to require a showing that the threatened party agreed to terms worse than its 
reservation point. See, e.g., Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). In 
Cooper, during the course of a mediation, the wife sent the husband a note in which she 
threatened to disclose to the police a photograph her husband had taken of a nude, and 
apparently underage, woman. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached an agreement giving the 
wife $128,000 of marital assets and the husband $10,000. A Florida Court of Appeals 
voided that agreement, calling the wife’s threat extortion. Id. at 712. After the settlement 
was consummated, the husband learned that the woman had been legal age at the time the 
photograph was taken and challenged the agreement. Id. Implicit in the decision is a 
conclusion that the husband would have done better had he gone forward with his litigation 
alternative in the absence of the threat. Joseph Livermore argues that the most courts can do 
in assessing alleged extortion in a litigation context is ask whether the settlement is worse 
than the reasonably calculable value of litigation—which is to say, the reservation point. See 
Joseph M. Livermore, Lawyer Extortion, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 407 (1978). 
 178.  See Giesel, supra note 169, at 463 (Commentators over the years have noted that 
the courts make an absolute mess of applying the duress doctrine.). 
 179.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. f, illus. 12 (1981). 
 180.  121 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1938). 
 181.  Id. at 879. 
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Fitzgerald’s father-in-law, also an employee and the family’s main bread-
winner, if Fitzgerald did not accept the $5,000 offer and release Perkins 
from further liability. Facing the financial ruin of his entire family, 
Fitzgerald accepted the offer and signed a release. He then sued Perkins for 
negligence, whereupon Perkins raised the release as a defense. The case 
went to a jury, which found Perkins negligent, rejected the defense of 
release, and awarded Fitzgerald $45,000. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, including the 
determination that the release was executed under duress. The court 
approved of the portion of the jury instructions defining duress as follows: 
You are instructed that releases and contracts, to be valid, must be 
voluntarily made, and, where executed under such circumstances as would 
enslave the will, the release or contract is void; because consent is of the 
essence of the contract or release, and where there is compulsion, there is 
not consent, for this must be voluntarily.182 
The jury instructions then provided that “[d]uress, by threats, exists not 
wherever a party has made a release under the influence of a threat, but 
only where such a threat excites a fear of some grievous wrong.”183 The 
Arkansas law emphasized the overborne will of the weaker party. The 
Supreme Court said virtually nothing about why Perkins’s threat to 
exercise its legal right constituted duress. 
Despite the lack of analysis, the facts of the case support the 
conclusion that negative leverage, when used to coerce a negotiating 
partner into accepting a deal worse than his reservation point, triggers a 
defense of duress.184 Perkins apparently had no business reason to fire 
Fitgerald’s father-in-law, who was a supervisor for the company.185 
Perkins’ sole purpose in threatening to fire him was to impose a cost on 
Fitzgerald for pursuing his BATNA of litigation. Further, the settlement 
Perkins extracted seemed well inferior to Fitzgerald’s reservation point. 
The jury returned a judgment worth almost ten times the settlement, and in 
evaluating the plaintiff’s damage claim for excessiveness, the Supreme 
 
 182.  Id. at 885. 
 183.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 184.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 275. Perillo notes that, while courts seldom 
articulate this rationale in their decisions, the facts of the duress cases support the 
proposition that duress normally requires that the threatened party agree to an unfair 
bargain. “Duress will generally not be found to exist unless the party exercising the coercion 
has been unjustly enriched.” Id. He cites Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 
477, 482 (D.N.J. 1999) for the principle that “where there is adequacy of consideration, 
there is generally no duress.” Id. In other words, duress exists only where a party has been 
coerced into accepting a deal worse than its reservation point; otherwise consideration 
would be adequate.  
 185.  Fitzgerald, 121 S.W.2d at 879. 
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Court expressly stated that the award was reasonable given the life-altering 
injuries Fitzgerald suffered.186 
In a case raising similar issues, Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson 
Co.,187 the plaintiffs were at-will employees of defendant Thompson. They 
had purchased stock in Thompson subject to a provision that Thompson 
could repurchase the stock if plaintiffs’ employment was terminated for 
any reason.188 Thompson demanded that plaintiffs resell Thompson their 
stock and threatened to fire them if they refused. Plaintiffs complied, but 
later brought suit to rescind the sale on grounds of duress. The Seventh 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for duress, even though 
Thompson would have been within its rights to fire them for any reason.189 
The court held that whether the agreement to resell the stock was the 
product of duress was a question of fact, but it gave no clear guidance on 
the proof required other than that plaintiffs had to show the threatened 
termination “deprived them of their free will.”190 
Like Fitzgerald, Laemmar appears to be an example of a negotiating 
party accepting an agreement worse than its reservation point due to the use 
of negative leverage by the other side. Plaintiffs and Thompson were 
negotiating over the sale of plaintiffs’ stock. Plaintiffs obviously believed 
the terms Thompson was offering were inferior to their reservation point. 
Thompson had no real desire to fire plaintiffs, since it was happy to keep 
them if it could retrieve its stock and did retain them after they agreed to 
resell it. Thompson used a threat to perform an action that did not advance 
its interests in order to coerce plaintiffs into accepting a deal worse than 
their reservation point. 
In Gallagher Drug Co. v. Robinson,191 Robinson admitted to stealing 
from his employer, Gallagher.192 Robinson agreed to repay the $2,000 he 
stole, apparently in exchange for an agreement not to prosecute. Robinson 
paid part of the money and then refused to pay the balance, whereupon 
Gallagher sued him to collect. Robinson argued that he agreed to pay the 
debt under duress. The court disagreed. It defined duress as “tantamount to 
compulsion which is an impulse or feeling of being irresistibly driven 
toward the performance of some irrational action.” It then found that 
 
 186.  Id. at 885–86. To put the numbers in perspective, $5,000 in 1935 would be roughly 
$84,000 in 2012 dollars. $45,000 would be over $750,000 in 2012 dollars. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics CPI Calculator, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm. 
 187.  Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 188.  Id. at 681. 
 189.  Id. at 682. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  232 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1965). 
 192.  Id. at 670. 
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Robinson “was a free agent, that he had a choice, that is, he had freedom in 
exercising his will in signing the written agreement or note herein sued 
upon by the plaintiff.”193 
The court’s focus in Gallagher on “irrational action” is critical. A key 
difference between Fitzgerald and Laemmar, on the one hand, and 
Gallagher, on the other, is that the plaintiffs in Fitzgerald and Laemmar 
were coerced into accepting a bargain that was worse than their reservation 
point. In Gallagher, however, Robinson agreed to repay only what he 
owed. Had the employer brought suit against him to recover what he stole, 
that is the minimum he would have been required to pay. He was not 
coerced into accepting a bargain worse than his reservation point. He did 
nothing irrational.194 
Cases in which courts find duress fail Nozick’s test of productive 
exchange195 and meet Westen’s test of coercion.196 The employers in 
Fitzgerald and Laemmar proposed actions that satisfied neither their nor 
their employees’ interests, standing alone, which is to say they involved the 
application of negative leverage. The resulting bargains were worse than 
the employees had reason to expect, given their reservation points. In the 
language of the Restatement, the employers’ proposals “did not benefit the 
offeror” and “were not on fair terms.”197 
 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 33. 
 195.  See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 196.  See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 197.  The Restatement cites another case fitting this pattern in an illustration relating to § 
176(1)(d), which is the section dealing with inherently improper threats. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1)(d) cmt. e, illus. 11. In the case, Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 
154 A.2d 625 (N.J. Super. 1959), a couple put down a deposit with a builder to buy a new 
home, but sought to escape the contract after marital strife developed. They demanded the 
return of their deposit, threatening the builder that they would sell to an undesirable 
purchaser if forced to complete the transaction. The builder refused to return the contract, 
but also refused to complete the sale. The purchasers sued for breach of contract to recover 
the deposit. Id. at 628. The court found duress, concluding that “where a party for purely 
malicious and unconscionable motives threatens to resell such a home to a purchaser, 
specially selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole purpose of injuring the 
builder’s business, fundamental fairness requires the conclusion that his conduct in making 
this threat be deemed ‘wrongful,’ as the term is used in the law of duress.” Id. at 630.  
The case is unusual, in that duress was used to defend a decision not to consummate a 
contract, rather than to escape a contractual obligation. The implication of the opinion, 
though, is that the builder would have acted under duress had it agreed to refund the deposit, 
and that seems to be the way the Restatement uses the case. In my view, the case does not 
belong in the category of inherently wrongful threats. What made this threat “wrongful” was 
that it used negative leverage in an attempt to coerce the builder into accepting a deal worse 
than his reservation point. 
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B.  Unconscionability: The Improper Use of Positive Leverage 
Because negative leverage can be coercive, it poses a special set of 
concerns. Courts deal with inappropriate uses of negative leverage in 
relatively consistent ways, even if they have not always recognized the 
intuitions that seem to guide the decisions or used consistent terminology. 
Deployments of negative leverage that involve threats of illegal conduct or 
threats that coerce a party into a bargain worse than its reservation point 
consistently meet judicial disapprobation. 
Positive leverage does not have the same coercive power as negative 
leverage. Consequently, it is less proscribed than negative leverage. 
Assuming a negotiator does not make material misrepresentations and no 
special duties exist, she is largely free to drive a hard bargain by holding 
out for the best possible terms. She is under no legal obligation to concede 
any portion of the available bargaining zone. Moreover, under most 
circumstances, a negotiator can freely lead a counterparty into a “bad” deal, 
in the sense of a deal worse than the counterparty’s reservation point. 
Freedom of contract is a powerful current in Anglo-American law, and the 
freedom to contract is understood to mean the freedom to bargain hard as 
well as the freedom to enter into bad deals.198 Courts normally will not 
review the adequacy of the consideration to ensure that agreements are 
fair.199 
An example of this principle is Remco Enterprises, Inc. v. Houston.200 
A consumer with a ninth-grade education entered into a rent-to-own 
agreement for a television that obligated her to pay more than twice the 
retail value of the television.201 The court enforced the agreement, 
emphasizing that the consumer received certain benefits from the rent-to-
own plan that she would not have gotten had she paid cash and that she had 
read the agreement and “knew how to multiply.”202 The court noted case 
 
 198.  See Ewert v. Lichtman, 55 A.2d 671 (N.J. Ch. 1947). The court enunciated a view 
of leverage consistent with a robust view of freedom of contract: 
Enmeshed in the entanglements of some unfortunate dilemma, many individuals and 
corporations have found it imperative to buy their emancipation from an obligation which 
they voluntarily assumed, or to dispose of some of their assets at a loss. Perhaps they did so 
under the weight of adversity or misadventure and were thus the victims of some stress, yet 
I think this court in such cases should act with supreme caution in abrogating and 
countermanding such dealings. The qualities of the bargain which the litigant once regarded 
as expedient and pragmatical ought not to be reprocessed by the court into actionable 
duress. 
Id. at 674. 
 199.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 334. 
 200.  677 P.2d 567 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
 201.  Id. at 570. 
 202.  Id. at 573. 
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law from other jurisdictions suggesting that a contract price 2 ½ times 
greater than retail value created a suspicion of unconscionability but 
concluded that her deal at only twice the retail value did not “shock the 
conscience” sufficiently to void the contract.203 
Despite courts’ traditional reluctance to upset contractual agreements 
in the absence of fraud or coercion, beginning in the nineteenth century, 
courts began to void or modify contractual obligations where positive 
leverage was used in an overreaching way. Because unconscionability has 
been widely recognized as a contract defense at law only for a relatively 
short time, the early decisions relied on a variety of other doctrines to 
police unfair bargains. In Joseph Perillo’s words, “The law courts searched 
for and found (even though not present under ordinary rules) failure of 
consideration, lack of consideration, lack of mutual assent, duress or 
misrepresentation, inadequacy of pleading, lack of integration into a written 
contract or a strained interpretation after finding ambiguity where little or 
no ambiguity existed.”204 The result was an incoherent body of law that has 
only begun to crystallize since the codification of unconscionability in the 
U.C.C..205 
The U.C.C. provides that a court may refuse to enforce a contract if it 
finds the contract was unconscionable at the time it was made, but it does 
not precisely define unconscionability.206 Nor does the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, which contains unconscionability language modeled 
on the U.C.C. provision.207 Typical judicial formulations of the doctrine 
state that unconscionability may be invoked to avoid contractual liability 
“only on a finding of both imperfections in the bargaining process, known 
as ‘procedural unconscionability,’ and an unfairly one-sided term, referred 
 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 334. 
 205.  See Barnhizer, supra note 132, at 194 (“Since adoption of U.C.C. § 2-302 (and the 
subsequent publication of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208), inequality of 
bargaining power has been strongly linked with unconscionability.”). 
 206.  See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). Unconscionable contract or Term. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term thereof may be 
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as 
to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
 207.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid 
any unconscionable result. 
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to as ‘substantive unconscionability.’”208 Procedural unconscionability 
includes cases in which a party is unfairly surprised by the terms in the 
agreement as well as cases in which the agreement was not truly 
“voluntary.”209 
1.  Procedural Unconscionability 
The “unfair surprise” form of unconscionability does not address the 
misuse of leverage. These cases typically involve unsophisticated 
consumers who enter into contracts of adhesion with onerous terms buried 
in fine print. The problem in these cases is not that a party was forced to 
agree to unfavorable terms—a use of positive leverage by the stronger 
party—but that a party did not know that it was agreeing to unfavorable 
terms.210 The weaker party can get relief only if it would not have agreed 
had it known the terms.211 These are cases in which the straightforward 
application of positive leverage would not have produced an agreement on 
those terms.212 
A different line of cases protects weaker parties from involuntary 
agreements reached as a result of the misuse of positive leverage. Many of 
the early cases used the language of duress, not unconscionability. For 
example, in News Publishing Co. v. Associated Press,213 a publisher had 
contracted with United Press to provide it syndicated news reports. When 
United Press went out of business, the publisher had no choice but to seek 
the same service from its only rival, Associated Press. Associated Press 
demanded that the publisher pay $10,000 more than other publishers were 
required to pay for the same service and surrender certain valuable 
guarantees. With no other access to the news it needed to survive, the 
publisher agreed. It then brought suit in tort against Associated Press and 
its officers for an unlawful combination and conspiracy.214 The court found 
 
 208.  Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2003). 
 209.  Id. at 1257. 
 210.  In general, courts enforce contracts of adhesion irrespective of whether the non-
drafting party read them, understood them, or even knew they existed. See Id. at 1204. 
 211.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(c) (1981). Section 211(c) 
addresses form contracts. It provides that a lack of knowledge of contract terms can indicate 
lack of assent “[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such 
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term.” Id. 
 212.  But see James J. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 315, 348–49 (1997). Professor White analyzed twenty-five Arizona cases applying 
Restatement section 211(c) and concluded that in many of the cases, either the terms were 
not hidden or a reasonably informed weaker party would have expected them. 
 213.  114 Ill. App. 241 (1904). 
 214.  Id. at 242–43. 
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that Associated Press had an obligation to the public that required it to 
provide its services to this publisher “upon the same terms and conditions 
that it rendered like service to other newspaper publishers throughout the 
country.”215 It held that the publisher was not bound by the agreement 
because it had agreed to the increased rate under duress, having no real 
choice but to acquiesce.216 
News Publishing is emblematic of a long line of cases, most involving 
common carriers, in which courts use the language of duress to describe 
situations in which a party uses positive leverage to extract unfair terms. 
The cases typically date from before unconscionability entered contract law 
as a free-standing defense.217 In many of the cases, a utility or railroad used 
its monopoly position to demand rates in excess of the amount prescribed 
by law.218 
The Restatement puts these cases in the category of duress. It classifies 
them as examples of “the use of power for illegitimate ends.”219  The 
illustrations in the comments to the rule give the following example: 
A, a municipal water company, seeking to induce B, a developer, to 
make a contract for the extension of water mains to his development at a 
price greatly in excess of that charge to those similarly situated, threatens to 
refuse to supply to B unless B makes the contract. B, having no reasonable 
alternative, makes the contract. Because the threat amounts to a use for 
illegitimate ends of A’s power not to supply water, the contract is voidable 
by B.220 
 
 215.  Id. at 251. 
 216.  Id. at 256. “The payment by appellant and the surrender of the said guaranties, as 
we think the evidence tends to show, being under duress, because of the necessities of its 
business, and not voluntary, there may be a recovery, for the reason that the Associated 
Press was under the same obligation to furnish to appellant news reports without 
discrimination, as the railroad companies in the cases referred to were bound to carry freight 
without extorting illegal and oppressive rates from the shipper.” Id. 
 217.  In some of the early duress cases, the courts actually refer to the unconscionability 
of the bargain. In Beckwith v. Guy Frisbie & Sons, the Vermont Supreme Court, in 
affirming that economic pressure alone can provide a defense of duress, stated:  
To make the payment a voluntary one the parties should stand upon an equal footing. Then 
there is the free exercise of will, and compromise or payment is voluntary and binding. But 
where one has the advantage of the other, where delay or a resort to the law is indifferent to 
the one, but may produce serious loss and injury to the other, it is unconscionable to press 
such advantage to the obtaining payment of unjust demands. That is extortion.”  
Beckwith v. Guy Frisbie & Sons, 32 Vt. 559, 566 (1860). 
 218.  See Newland v. Buncombe Turnpike Co., 26 N.C. 372 (1844); Mobile & M. R. 
Co. v. Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559 (1878); Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co. 
v. Wilson, 32 N.E. 311 (Ind. 1892). 
 219.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(c)(2) (1981). 
 220.  Id. § 176 cmt. f, illus. 16. 
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In this example, A uses positive leverage—its power to satisfy and 
refuse to satisfy B’s interests. B has no alternative source for water, so A’s 
leverage is very potent. But A overreached, pushing for a deal that is 
patently unfair to B. 
Unconscionability is a better fit than duress for these overreaching 
exercises of positive leverage.221 The weaker party has not been coerced in 
a moral sense. The more powerful party has taken advantage of a 
vulnerability caused by external events, but it has not created that situation. 
No threat of reprisal looms in the event that the weaker party chooses to 
pursue an alternative to an agreement with the stronger party. In practice, 
courts today are more likely to invoke unconscionability than duress when 
addressing the misuse of positive leverage in cases like the old common-
carrier examples. 
Under modern contract doctrine, misuses of positive leverage in these 
ways can rise to the level of procedural unconscionability. An agreement 
may be procedurally unconscionable where a party’s acceptance of terms 
was not truly voluntary.222  Courts look at a variety of factors to assess 
voluntariness: “[a] lack of voluntariness is demonstrated in contracts of 
adhesion when there is a great imbalance in the parties’ relative bargaining 
power, the stronger party’s terms are unnegotiable, and the weaker party is 
prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to 
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from 
contracting at all.”223 
Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Co.224 presents a factual 
scenario strikingly similar to the one in News Publishing, but relies on 
unconscionability rather than duress. The owner of a small radio station in 
Arkansas had a contract with United Press International to supply it with 
syndicated news.225 When UPI stopped doing business in Arkansas, the 
station had no choice but to go to Associated Press. Under the terms of the 
agreement Associated Press demanded, the station was liable for exorbitant 
 
 221.  Basing his analysis primarily on English common law rather than U.S. law, 
Professor John Phillips has also argued that many forms of duress are better understood as 
instances of unconscionability. See John Phillips, Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous 
Negotiation Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine, 45 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 837, 849–52 (2010). 
 222.  Alternatively, procedural unconscionability can arise from unfair surprise. See 
Bank of Indiana, Nat’l. Ass’n. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109–10 (S.D. Miss. 1979) 
(“The indicators of procedural unconscionability generally fall into two areas: (1) lack of 
knowledge, and (2) lack of voluntariness.”). 
 223.  Id. See also Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1258–69 (analyzing factors including 
adhesive nature of contracts, unequal bargaining power, lack of sophistication, and unfair 
surprise). 
 224.  809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991). 
 225.  Id. at 695. 
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“lost revenues” in the event of a breach.226 The station ultimately breached 
the contract and Associated Press sued to recover its lost revenues. The 
court held that the lost revenue term was unconscionable and 
unenforceable, concluding that “[t]he agreement is a preprinted form; the 
provision relating to loss of future revenue is harsh in its operation; the 
contract was signed at a time when the [station] was already in default 
under its terms; and there appears to be a substantial disparity in the 
relative bargaining power of the parties.”227 
The key consideration in cases of this type is the presence (or absence) 
of meaningful alternatives.228 A party can lack meaningful alternatives 
either because it is dealing with a monopolist, as in the common-carrier 
cases, or because situation-specific circumstances limit its options.229 In 
Sosa v. Paulos,230 the defendant doctor performed knee surgery on the 
elderly plaintiff. Less than one hour before the surgery, after the plaintiff 
had been dressed and prepped for the procedure, she was presented with a 
“Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement” requiring her to consent to 
arbitration of any claims arising out of her care.231 She signed the 
agreement and later brought suit against the doctor for medical malpractice. 
The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on grounds of 
unconscionability. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not enter into 
the agreement voluntarily, emphasizing the timing and finding that the 
plaintiff felt “rushed and hurried.”232 The court held that “[u]nder these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the arbitration agreement was 
negotiated in a fair manner and that the parties had a real and voluntary 
meeting of the minds. Nor can we conclude that Ms. Sosa had a meaningful 
 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 697. 
 228.  See Barnhizer, supra note 132, at 202–08. Barnhizer separates out “meaningful 
alternatives” and “opportunity for negotiation” as separate tests of oppressive bargaining 
power. Id. at 201–02. But he also notes that courts conflate the distinction. Id. at 208. In my 
view, the distinction is does not convey a genuine difference, and that is why courts appear 
to conflate the two concepts. Parties lack a meaningful opportunity to negotiate because 
they lack meaningful alternatives to a negotiated agreement. 
 229.  See Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1264. Korobkin describes a situation-specific 
monopoly in these terms: “In the typical situation, a seller operating in a competitive 
environment publicizes a product’s price and/or some other visible features, which 
encourages a potential buyer to make an investment in time or money in preparing to 
purchase the product. Then, after the buyer’s investment of time or money has been made, 
the seller presents a set of adhesive form terms that the buyer must sign or forfeit his initial 
investment.” Id. 
 230.  924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
 231.  Id. at 359. 
 232.  Id. at 362–63. The court found the agreement substantively unconscionable 
because it would have required her to pay the doctor’s legal expenses if he prevailed in the 
arbitration. Id. at 362. 
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choice with respect to signing the agreement.”233 With surgery imminent, 
Sosa did not have a realistic option of seeking care from another medical 
provider. The lack of a meaningful alternative was sufficient to show 
procedural unconscionability. 
2.  Substantive Unconscionability 
These cases involve situations in which a stronger party imposes terms 
on a particularly vulnerable counterparty. The weaker party acquiesces 
because it believes it has no other way of meeting its needs. The weaker 
party did not agree to a deal worse than its perceived reservation point: 
because of a lack of good alternatives, it simply has a very poor reservation 
point.234 Although courts speak about a lack of voluntariness, there is no 
coercion in a moral sense.235 The wrong these cases seek to redress is the 
use of bargaining power to impose unfair terms. For an exercise of leverage 
to be sufficiently unconscionable to void a contractual obligation, it must 
be coupled with an agreement that is substantively unconscionable. 
Substantive unconscionability has been couched in a variety of ways. 
In one widely-cited early case interpreting U.C.C. § 2-302, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit described substantive 
unconscionability in these terms: 
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must 
be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances 
existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it be 
mechanically applied. . . . Corbin suggests the test as being whether the 
terms are “so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores 
and business practices of the time and place.”236 
That sounds like an attempt to define a standard for the application of 
Peter Westen’s “ought” criterion for overreaching exercises of leverage.237 
 
 233.  Id. at 363. 
 234.  See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In 
Henningsen, one of the seminal unconscionability cases, the plaintiff’s wife was injured in a 
car accident. The plaintiff had purchased the car under a standard form sales contract 
promulgated by the Automobile Manufacturer’s Association and used by all the major 
manufacturers. Under the agreement, the manufacturer’s liability was limited to replacement 
of defective parts. Id. at 78–79. The court held the agreement unconscionable because of the 
“gross inequality of bargaining position” between the parties and the absence of a 
meaningful opportunity to find better warranty terms with other manufacturers. Id. at 87. 
 235.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 233. Wertheimer refers to these cases as 
involving “hard choices” rather than coercion. 
 236.  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
Section 2-302 was not yet in effect in Washington, D.C. at the time of the decision, but the 
court applied the statutory test. See Leff, supra note 139, at 551. 
 237.  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
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Whether coerced or not, there are certain ways people ought to be treated in 
a just society. Courts allow parties to drive hard bargains up to the point at 
which the resulting bargain is so unfair that it violates broadly accepted 
social norms. Not surprisingly, it is exceedingly difficult to find language 
that precisely delineates the outer limits of hard bargaining. In the years 
since § 2-302 was adopted, no single test of substantive unconscionability 
has emerged.238 Instead, courts use imprecise terms to label agreements 
that they deem inappropriate, describing them as “overly harsh,” “one-
sided,” or “shocking to the conscience.”239 That degree of specificity is 
probably the most that can be expected. 
C.  Borderland Cases: The Contract Modification Problem 
Thus far, I have deliberately avoided the class of cases that has most 
bedeviled courts and fueled scholarly criticism of duress and its offshoots: 
cases involving threats to breach a contract unless a party in a 
disadvantaged position agrees to new terms more favorable to the stronger 
party. In these cases, circumstances leave the weaker party dependent on 
the stronger party, whereupon the stronger party refuses to fulfill its 
existing contractual obligations absent a new promise of additional 
compensation. These cases involve parties who take advantage of a 
situation rather than creating it, and they involve the refusal to satisfy 
interests rather than the imposition of some exogenous cost. In addition, the 
weaker party accepts the proposed modification precisely because that is a 
better option than its alternatives of finding other bargaining partners or 
seeking compensation for the breach. For these reasons, the cases appear to 
be exercises of positive leverage. But courts and commentators tend to treat 
them as examples of duress. 
Probably the most famous case of this type is Alaska Packers’ Ass’n. 
v. Domenico.240 In Alaska Packers’, a group of fishermen contracted with 
Alaska Packers to fish for salmon at a wage of $50 for the season plus two 
cents for each salmon caught. Once the fisherman arrived in Alaska at the 
start of the season, they refused to work unless Alaska Packers agreed to 
pay them $100 for the season plus two cents for each salmon. With the 
fishing season about to begin, Alaska Packers had no time to recruit new 
fisherman or to go to court to compel its recalcitrant group to work at the 
agreed rate. So Alaska Packers agreed to the $100 demand. At the end of 
the season, the company refused to pay anything beyond the original 
amount and the fishermen brought suit to recover the difference. The Ninth 
 
 238.  See Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1273.  
 239.  See id. 
 240.  117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
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Circuit held that the revised contract was not enforceable: “[T]he party who 
refuses to perform, and thereby coerces a promise from the other party to 
the contract to pay him an increased compensation for doing that which he 
is legally bound to do, takes unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of 
the other party.”241 The court did not use the term duress, justifying its 
decision instead on the absence of consideration. Modern scholars, led by 
Richard Posner,242 have characterized the decision as one applying duress, 
and a number of cases cite it in holding that the use of positive leverage can 
constitute duress where a party exploits a temporary monopoly (as the 
fisherman had over Alaska Packers) to extract concessions not warranted 
by any changed circumstances.243 
The contract modification cases in the Alaska Packers’ line are 
difficult because the existence of an agreement, and with it the obligation to 
satisfy the interests of the other party through performance, complicates the 
leverage calculus.244 Alaska Packers had a legal right to expect the seamen 
to fulfill their contractual obligations. To the extent the seamen had an 
alternative to performance, it was to breach the contract, which they had no 
legal right to do. Thus, their threatened conduct—breaching the agreement 
by refusing to work—seems less like an exercise of positive leverage than 
appears at first glance. 
In the absence of changed circumstances, their proposal did not appear 
to involve a voluntary exchange in Nozick’s terms. Again assuming that 
circumstances did not change for the seamen in Alaska Packers’, their 
refusal to work absent a pay increase was purely opportunistic. They had 
no reason to refuse to work except to exploit the weak position of Alaska 
Packers. Stuck in Alaska and without other employment opportunities 
readily available, they stood more to gain from working than not working. 
Neither they nor Alaska Packers stood to gain from their remaining idle, 
and they had no right to demand additional compensation for performing 
the pre-existing agreement. Alaska Packers could legitimately feel coerced, 
even though the resulting bargain was better than its alternative of 
foregoing the voyage and suing the seamen for breach. 
 
 241.  Id. at 102. 
 242.  See Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB, 338 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 243.  See also John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 258 
(1942). 
 244.  See also Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971). 
Loral is a favorite of contracts textbook authors. It involved a government contractor whose 
subcontractor refused to deliver parts unless the contractor agreed to price increases and 
additional orders. The contractor acquiesced because it could not find another subcontractor 
to supply the parts in time to meet its deadline. The New York Court of Appeals voided the 
modification on duress grounds. Loral is another case in which the modification was not 
justified by any change in circumstances. 
KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE) SUN 2/9  9:39 PM 
Season 201x] Desktop Publishing Example 153 
On the other hand, if circumstances had changed, the analysis might be 
different. Assume conditions at sea turned out to be much worse than the 
parties initially expected. The seamen might rationally conclude that the 
contemplated work was not worth the risks involved, and that their interests 
would genuinely be served by refusing to work and accepting whatever 
costs they would bear by way of Alaska Packers’s breach of contract 
lawsuit.245 In that scenario, the demand for a wage increase would arguably 
be productive in Nozick’s sense, because it would compensate them for 
pursuing an interest that breach would have satisfied. 
Most of the modern commentary on contract modification argues that 
changed circumstances can justify a threatened breach.246 At least some 
courts have adopted that view.247 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
adopts that test as well, stating that “[a] promise modifying a duty under a 
contract no fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification 
is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties 
when the contract was made. . . .”248 
Changed circumstances also change the nature of the leverage 
involved. Where changed circumstances mean that a party is better off 
breaching and accepting the consequences of breach than performing, the 
threat of breach is a noncoercive exercise of positive leverage. In such a 
case, the renegotiated terms should be enforced. But when the threat of 
breach is merely opportunistic, and breach is not in the threatening party’s 
interests, the threat has elements of both positive and negative leverage and 
is much more coercive. Consequently, the renegotiated terms should not be 
enforced. Whether courts use the rubric of duress or that of 
unconscionability to justify the refusal to enforce the modified terms is less 
important than that they focus on the coercive force of the leverage used to 
extract the modification.249 
 
 245.  See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L REV. 717, 
757 (2005). The authors argue that the seamen’s refusal to work absent greater 
compensation may have been justified, based on speculation that they had been misled about 
prevailing wages and the working conditions they could expect. Id. 
 246.  See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
335, 339–40 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: Ana Analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 308 (1992); Richard 
A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 422–23 
(1977). 
 247.  See Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (R.I. 1974). 
 248.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981). See also U.C.C. §2-209 cmt. 
2 (1977) (providing that “matters such as a market shift, which makes performance come to 
involve a loss,” may provide a reason for a modification). 
 249.  A powerful economic argument can be made for focusing on changed 
circumstances. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 245, at 753–54. The reason is that 
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D.  Leverage and the Law of Contract: Concluding Thoughts 
I have shown that courts assessing claims of overreaching leverage 
focus on the same considerations that underlie social proscriptions against 
coercion. Courts generally enforce parties’ bargains where there is no 
evidence of misrepresentation, subterfuge, or diminished capacity to 
indicate that a party did not truly understand what it had agreed to.250 There 
are exceptions, however, that turn on two factors: the nature of the 
proposals that led to the agreement and the terms of the resulting bargain. 
Where a proposal consists of inherently wrongful conduct, such as a 
threat of illegal action, the resulting terms are largely irrelevant. A party 
does not act within its rights when it engages in illegal conduct, so an 
agreement reached as a result of such a threat cannot be enforced. Those 
are rare and uninteresting cases. 
Where threatened conduct is not inherently wrongful, the first step in 
determining whether an agreement procured as a result is enforceable is to 
ask whether the proposal involves negative leverage, with the concomitant 
risk of coercion. A proposal involves negative leverage if the threatened 
conduct benefits neither the proposing party nor the counterparty. Because 
not all uses of negative leverage are inappropriate, however, a thorough 
analysis must continue. An agreement reached as a result of the application 
of negative leverage is voidable only if the resulting terms are worse than 
the threatened party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The best 
practical evidence that negative leverage was employed is when a party 
agreed to terms worse than its best alternative. Positive leverage cannot 
force a party into an agreement worse than its BATNA, so if a party agreed 
to terms worse than its reservation point, negative leverage must have been 
used. 
If the proposal involves positive rather than negative leverage, the 
agreement is presumed valid and enforceable. Positive leverage cannot 
coerce. Positive leverage can be used to take advantage, however, and 
under some circumstances positive leverage is used to extract agreements 
that violate social norms to such a degree that they are voidable. The legal 
tests for when an agreement is unfair to the point that it is unenforceable 
 
the threatened party should be given the option of accepting modified terms in order to 
procure performance, since that may be the best option available. If the law will not enforce 
the modified bargain, then the threatening party will simply walk away, leaving the weaker 
party stranded. But that is a risk only where the threatening party has a genuine incentive to 
breach and accept the consequences. Id. 
 250.  These cases are beyond the scope of my analysis because they do not involve the 
use of leverage to procure an agreement. The leverage in these cases is hidden or fabricated. 
The bargain is suspect because one party claims it would not have acquiesced had it not 
been misled. 
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are notoriously imprecise. In the absence of deception, trickery, or 
diminished capacity, only the rare agreement will succumb under the 
applicable standards. Parties are largely free to use positive leverage to 
drive hard bargains that produce one-sided deals. 
Beyond clarifying the relationship between leverage and coercion and 
the role leverage plays in judicial decisions regulating contract 
negotiations, my goal was to demonstrate how two related contract 
doctrines, duress and unconscionability, can be applied more consistently if 
they are understood to address negative and positive leverage, respectively. 
A more nuanced concept of leverage may be of value in understanding and 
applying other legal doctrines beyond the scope of this work, like claims of 
prosecutorial abuse in plea bargaining.251 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the first federal budget battle of 2013 lurched from winter into 
spring, Congressional Republicans backed away from the debt ceiling 
stand-off and turned their attention to the package of budget cuts known as 
the sequester.252 The sequester, enacted as part of the 2011 budget deal, 
stipulated across-the-board cuts in discretionary spending, on everything 
from after-school programs to defense.253 Both parties had agreed on the 
package of sequestration cuts because they believed that the threat of 
across-the-board cuts would force them to negotiate for a more rational 
package of cuts that might better satisfy the interests of each.254 When the 
sequestration cuts came due, however, the two sides dug in again. President 
Obama demanded further increases in revenue and Congressional 
Republicans refused to contemplate any tax changes that would bring in 
more revenue. The cuts went into effect.255 
President Obama continued to blame Republicans for the impasse, but 
he used very different language than when he attacked Republicans over 
the debt-ceiling threat. He described the sequester as “not smart” and 
accused Republicans of being out of touch with middle class voters.256 He 
predicted dire consequences, which he sought to lay at Republicans’ 
 
 251.  See generally, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The 
Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U.L. REV. 63 (2011). 
 252.  See Doyle McManus, The GOP’s Tactical Retreat, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 
27, 2013, at A20. Republicans quietly agreed to suspend the debt ceiling for five months. Id. 
 253.  See Jonathan Tamari, Congress Seems Resigned to Sequestration, THE 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 3, 2013, at A1. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  See Paul Harris, US faces huge job losses as Obama orders $85bn cuts, THE 
OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2013, at 29. 
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feet.257 But he did not charge anyone with hostage-taking or using leverage 
inappropriately. 
The difference in the characterization of the debt-ceiling threat and the 
sequester intransigence reflects differences in the types of leverage 
employed. The threatened refusal to raise the debt ceiling constituted 
negative leverage—neither side would have benefited. The sole purpose 
was to impose a cost on the President—really a cost on the entire 
government—for refusing Republican demands on budget cuts. That is 
why it appeared coercive and why President Obama could credibly charge 
Republicans with hostage-taking. But Republicans were acting within their 
rights when they chose their alternative—the sequester—to agreeing to 
further tax increases. They were exercising positive leverage. Not 
coincidentally, the President’s attacks focused on the reasonableness of the 
Republicans’ proposals. 
I’ve analyzed the uses and limits of leverage in negotiation by 
measuring different forms of leverage against the yardstick of coercion. I 
have shown how social norms against coercion can be explained in 
negotiation terms, and  have used these insights to help elucidate some 
common but problematic legal categories. Identifying an exercise of 
leverage as positive or negative, however, does not answer the question of 
whether that use of leverage is good or bad. Negative leverage can be used 
in appropriate ways and positive leverage can be used in inappropriate 
ways. Ultimately, those assessments are grounded in social norms that are 
not easily defined. But a better understanding of the forms and uses of 
leverage can help negotiators and courts think more clearly about why 
certain uses of leverage seem to cross social and legal boundaries. 
 
 
 257.  Id. 
